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ACHIEVING REAL PARITY: INCREASING ACCESS TO 
TREATMENT FOR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS UNDER THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE 
MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT 
Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Worthy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Richard Clarke had an alcohol use disorder.1 Given that Richard had 
been drinking to excess on multiple occasions, his physician recommended 
enrollment in a thirty-day inpatient alcohol detoxification and rehabilitation 
program.2 Yet, despite the fact that Richard’s insurance policy explicitly 
stated that it covered such treatment, his insurer refused to approve it.3 
Shortly after, Richard attempted to commit suicide by drinking a substantial 
amount of alcohol, ingesting cocaine, swallowing a handful of prescription 
drugs, and locking himself in his garage with the car engine running.4 The 
local district court ordered that Richard be committed to a thirty-day detoxi-
fication and rehabilitation program, and yet, Richard’s insurance carrier still 
refused to cover such treatment.5 According to the court, “[b]y now, it was 
tragically apparent to everyone but [the insurer] that [Richard] was a danger 
to himself and perhaps others.”6 As an alternative to inpatient treatment, the 
court ordered Richard to be committed to a local correctional facility for 
detoxification and rehabilitation.7 While there, he received little therapy or 
treatment.8 Less than a month after his release in October 1994, Richard 
purchased a six-pack of beer, attached a garden hose from the tailpipe of his 
car to the passenger compartment, and successfully committed suicide.9 In a 
suit brought by Richard’s widow against the insurer, the court noted: 
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 1. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 50 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 2. Id. at 50–51. 
 3. Id. at 51. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 51. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 51–52. 
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As a consequence of [the insurer’s] failure to pre-approve—whether 
willful, or the result of negligent medical decisions made during the 
course of utilization review—[Richard] never received the treatment he 
so desperately required, suffered horribly, and ultimately died needlessly 
at age forty-one. 
. . . . 
This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for 
Congress to amend [insurance laws] to account for the changing realities 
of the modern health care system.
10 
In August 2012, nearly twenty years after Richard Clarke’s death, Mi-
chael Mitrano died despite seeking help from several treatment programs for 
a substance use disorder (SUD).11 SUDs are diagnosed based on pathologi-
cal patterns of behaviors related to use of particular substances12 and are 
measured on a broad range of severity, from mild to severe, based on the 
presence of certain criteria.13 When discussing his son’s death, Michael’s 
father, Benedetto Mitrano, said, “Insurance always refused to pay for one 
reason or another . . . . [Michael] was never ‘sick enough.’ My son is dead. 
Is he sick enough for them now?”14 Richard Clarke and Michael Mitrano are 
not alone. In 2011, 21.6 million people aged twelve or older suffered from 
SUDs, and yet an estimated 89.6% of them went untreated, creating a mas-
sive treatment gap.15 Of individuals surveyed between 2009 and 2012, 
48.3% of those who sought addiction treatment claimed that a lack of 
 
 10. Id. at 52–53 (footnote omitted). 
 11. Kennedy Calling for Equal Coverage of Mental Health —Yes, Still, WBUR’S 
COMMONHEALTH REFORM & REALITY (Mar. 29, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://commonhealth.wbur.
org/2013/03/mental-health-parity-states [hereinafter Kennedy Calling for Equal Coverage]. 
 12. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 483 (5th ed. 2013). Substances of abuse include alcohol; cannabis; hallucinogens 
(with separate categories for phencyclidine or similarly acting arylcyclohexylamines); inhal-
ants; opioids; sedatives, hypnotics, and anxiolytics; stimulants (amphetamine-type substanc-
es, cocaine, and other stimulants), tobacco, and other (or unknown) substances. Id. at 481. 
 13. Id. at 484. Although the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5) addresses each of nine specific classes as a separate use disorder 
(e.g., alcohol use disorder, stimulant use disorder, etc.), it states that the diagnosis of sub-
stance use disorder can be applied to all nine classes. Therefore, this document will refer to 
such disorders collectively as “substance use disorders” or “SUDs.” The criteria for measur-
ing the severity of an SUD can be found in DSM-5’s section on SUDs. See id. at 483–84. 
 14. Kennedy Calling for Equal Coverage, supra note 11. 
 15. Briefing on Substance Use Treatment and Recovery in the United States: Executive 
Summary, SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://partnersforrecovery.
samhsa.gov/docs/Briefing_Substance_Use_Treatment.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
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“health insurance or a benefit plan that covered addiction treatment” pre-
vented them from actually obtaining such treatment.16 
Despite the enactment of laws aimed at expanding access to health 
care—like the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (Eq-
uity Act) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) 
—long-standing prejudices against and misunderstandings about SUDs have 
prevented access to care for those who suffer from such disorders.17 
There are two main reasons why proper parity of SUD treatment with 
other medical or surgical needs is lacking. “First is the stigmatization of 
addictive disorders—the idea that [individuals with SUDs] do not deserve 
treatment because they cause their own illness[es].”18 Various studies have 
shown that SUDs, in particular, are highly stigmatized health conditions.19 
In addition to the self-stigma that an individual with an SUD may place on 
himself and the social stigma perpetuated by society at large, there are also 
structural stigmas that contribute to the stigmatization of addictive disor-
ders.20 A “structural stigma refers to the rules, policies and procedures of 
institutions that restrict the rights and opportunities for members of stigma-
tized groups.”21 Members of the healthcare industry, including insurance 
providers, may hold negative beliefs about individuals with SUDs—that 
they overuse system resources, are not invested in their own health, abuse 
the system through drug-seeking behavior and diversion22 of medications, or 
fail to adhere to recommended care.23 These “perceptions can contribute to 
inequitable and poor provision of care for people with [such] disorders.”24 
The second reason why parity is lacking in SUD treatment and other 
medical or surgical needs concerns the misconception that SUD treatment is 
too expensive for society to afford.25 According to the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse (NIDA), substance use costs the U.S. over $600 billion per 
 
 16. David Mee-Lee, Integrating Services for Co-Occurring Disorders and General 
Healthcare: How the ASAM Criteria Help, ADDICTION HEALTH SUMMIT 2 (Feb. 28, 2014), 
http://addictionhealthsummit.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/meelee-handout.pdf. 
 17. Norman S. Miller & Robert M. Swift, Primary Care Medicine and Psychiatry: Ad-
dictions Treatment, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 408, 408–09, 415 (1997). 
 18. Id. at 415. 
 19. James D. Livingston et al., The Effectiveness of Interventions for Reducing Stigma 
Related to Substance Use Disorders: A Systematic Review, 107 ADDICTION 39, 40 (2012). 
 20. Id. at 39–40. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Diversion “is defined as the transfer of a prescription drug from a lawful to an un-
lawful channel of distribution or use.” Khary K. Rigg et al., Patterns of Prescription Medica-
tion Diversion Among Drug Dealers, 19 DRUGS: EDUC. PREVENTION & POL’Y 145, 145 
(2012). 
 23. Livingston et al., supra note 19 at 39−50. 
 24. Id. at 40. 
 25. See, e.g., Jason Schwartz, Too Expensive?, ADDICTION & RECOVERY NEWS (Nov. 11, 
2011, 5:39 AM), http://addictionandrecoverynews.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/too-expensive. 
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year.26 However, it is more costly to let SUDs go untreated because SUD 
treatment reduces associated health and social costs by well over the cost of 
treatment itself.27 For instance, “every [public] dollar invested in [SUD] 
treatment programs yields a return of between $4 and $7 in reduced drug-
related crime, criminal justice costs, and theft.”28 In addition to the reduction 
in social costs, treating SUDs will provide further benefits to society, as well 
as the individual, as a result of “fewer interpersonal conflicts; greater work-
place productivity; and fewer drug-related accidents, including overdoses 
and deaths.”29 
Yet, by exploiting the long-engrained stigma against SUDs, private and 
government insurers are impeding access to such treatment in order to re-
duce their health care spending. Insurance companies frequently offer com-
prehensive coverage for medical and surgical benefits but place severe limi-
tations on coverage for SUD treatment.30 
Private and public insurers, including state Medicaid providers, are vio-
lating the Equity Act, and in some cases the ACA and state parity laws, 
when the quality and quantity of covered SUD treatment services are not 
equivalent to those of other covered physical health treatments. Federal and 
state governments must act to ensure access to adequate SUD treatment, to 
prevent discrimination, and to ensure that cost reductions are applied fairly. 
This Article serves as a guide for both legal representatives of individuals 
with SUDs who are unlawfully denied benefits and state lawmakers in a 
position to bolster state legislation on this issue. It instructs such individuals 
on how to recognize a violation of the law and how to bring various en-
forcement actions for noncompliance. It also recommends how states can 
take a more active role in access to care by enforcing federal parity laws and 
by implementing and enforcing more stringent state parity laws. 
Part I of this Article provides background information, including a 
brief overview of the U.S. health insurance system, to provide a foundation 
and terminology for the remainder of the Article; the current status of the 
substance-use epidemic in the U.S., establishing a nationwide need for ex-
tensive access to treatment; and trends toward social acceptance of SUD 
treatment, paving the way for extensive federal and state legislation. It also 
provides an overview of such legislation, including the Equity Act, the 
ACA, and state parity laws and regulations as they pertain to coverage of 
SUD treatment. Part II discusses common insurance coverage restrictions 
 
 26. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A 
RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 12 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/
default/files/podat_1.pdf. 
 27. Id. at 12–13. 
 28. Id. at 13. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Miller & Swift, supra note 17, at 415. 
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placed on SUD treatment and analyzes how such restrictions violate the 
Equity Act, the ACA, and state parity laws in light of the statutes, regula-
tions, and emerging case law. Part III provides guidance on how to bring 
enforcement actions under these laws, and makes recommendations of ways 
in which states can take the lead by enacting and enforcing federal and state 
parity laws while fairly reducing health care costs. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of Insurance Programs 
To understand the laws governing insurers, it is important to first un-
derstand the basics of how private and government-funded insurance plans 
operate. This section provides a brief overview of the insurance system. 
1. Private Insurers 
Private insurance companies sell private health care plans to individu-
als as part of an individual plan or to employers as part of a group plan.31 
“Group [p]lans are offered through an employer or association,” whereas an 
individual plan may be purchased independent of any affiliation.32 There are 
two main types of private plans: fee-for-service plans and managed care 
plans. Fee-for-service plans, also referred to as non-managed care plans, are 
private health care plans in which physicians charge patients directly; the 
insurance company then reimburses a specific percentage or set amount of 
the bill to the patient.33 These plans allow for flexibility in choosing physi-
cians and hospitals.34 However, they are typically more expensive than other 
types of insurance plans.35 Managed care plans are insurance plans that gen-
erally provide comprehensive service to their members and offer financial 
incentives for the patients to use the providers who are within their net-
work.36 
 
 31. CPS Health Insurance Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/hhes/www/hlthins /methodology/definitions/cps.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). 
 32. Explanation of Health Insurance Terms and Coverages, ALA. DEPARTMENT INS., 
http://www.aldoi.gov /consumers/HealthInsExplain.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
 33. Healthcare Plan Information: Plan Types, U.S. OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., https://
www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/plan-information/plan-types/ (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2014). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Definitions of Health Insurance Terms, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. 4 (Feb. 2002), 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs /ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf. 
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2. Medicaid 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state entitlement program that pays for ser-
vices on behalf of certain eligible low-income persons.37 Within broad na-
tional guidelines, each state runs its own Medicaid program, and the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) monitors the programs in each 
state.38 States establish their own eligibility standards; determine the type, 
amount, duration, and scope of services; and set the rates of payment for 
services.39 
States may offer coverage through standard, state-run, fee-for-service 
Medicaid plans; Alternative Benefit Plans (ABPs); or managed care plans.40 
ABPs are a type of fee-for-service Medicaid benefits package that provide 
benchmark or benchmark-equivalent state plan benefits.41 As of January 1, 
2014, all adults aged 19 to 65 without children or with dependent children 
who qualify for Medicaid will be enrolled in ABPs.42 “Benchmark” means 
that the benefits are at least equal to one of four plans specified in the ACA: 
(1) the Standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield Preferred Provider Option offered 
through the Federal Employees Health Benefit program; (2) state employee 
coverage that is offered and generally available to state employees; (3) the 
commercial HMO with the largest insured commercial, non-Medicaid en-
rollment in the state; and (4) secretary-approved coverage, which can in-
clude the Medicaid state plan-benefit package offered in that state.43 
“Benchmark-equivalent” means that the benefits include certain specified 
 
 37. Barbara S. Klees, Christian J. Wolfe & Catherine A. Curtis, Brief Summaries of 
Medicare & Medicaid: Title XVIII and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, CENTER FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES 18 (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2009.pdf. 
 38. Definitions of Health Insurance Terms, supra note 36, at 3, 18. 
 39. Klees, Wolfe, & Curtis, supra note 37. 
 40. Mark Hayes, NAT’L ASS’N OF CMTY. HEALTH CTRS., MEDICAID PREMIUM 
ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: SPOTLIGHT ON THE STATES #5, at 3 (2013), 
available at http://www.nachc.com/client /Exchange%20Issue%20Brief%205.pdf. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(A) (2012); Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance 
Programs: Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160, 
42,160 (July 15, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438, 440, 447 & 457; 
45 C.F.R. pts. 155 & 156); CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SMDL # 
12-003, STATE MEDICAID DIRECTOR LETTER RE: ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS IN THE 
MEDICAID PROGRAM 1 (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-
Policy-Guidance/downloads/SMD-12-003.pdf. 
 42. 42 C.F.R. § 435.119 (2013). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(1)(A)–(D); Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
grams: Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,190; CINDY 
MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 1–2. 
2014] ACHIEVING REAL PARITY 561 
services and the overall benefits are at least actuarially equivalent to one of 
the statutorily specified benchmark coverage packages.44 
Under Medicaid managed care plans, individuals enroll with individual 
managed care organizations (MCOs).45 MCOs make arrangements with state 
Medicaid agencies to deliver Medicaid health benefits and additional ser-
vices in exchange for payment.46 MCOs may provide services that fee-for-
service plans are unable to provide, such as disease management and inno-
vations in care coordination.47 
“Medicaid policies [on] eligibility, services, and payment are complex 
and vary considerably . . . .48 Thus, a person who is eligible for Medicaid in 
one State may not be eligible in another State.”49 
B. An Overview of the Prescription Drug Epidemic, Substance Use Dis-
orders, and Medication-Assisted Treatment 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has officially 
declared that prescription drug abuse50 in the United States is an epidemic.51 
Recent data indicate that about 2 million people begin abusing prescription 
 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2); Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: 
Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,190; CINDY MANN, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 1. 
 45. JEAN HEARNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30726, PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE 
UNDER MEDICAID 5 (2008). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Robert Book, Benefits and Challenges of Medicaid Managed Care, FORBES (Oct. 18, 
2012, 10:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/10/18/benefits-and-challenges-of-
medicaid-managed-care/. 
 48. Klees, Wolfe & Curtis, supra note 37, at 18. 
 49. Id. 
 50. “‘[P]rescription drug abuse is . . . ‘the intentional self-administration of a medication 
for a nonmedical purpose such as “getting high.”‘ This . . . includes all degrees of medication 
use with the intention of experiencing a high, from teens swallowing pills from medicine 
cabinets to inveterate addicts ‘shooting’ morphine. Abuse and nonmedical use are synony-
mous for the purpose of this [A]rticle.” CTR. FOR LAWFUL ACCESS & ABUSE DETERRENCE, 
NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION STRATEGY 7 (2010) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting N.P. Katz et al., Challenges in the Development of Prescription Opioid Abuse-
Deterrent Formulations, 23 CLINICAL J. PAIN 648 (2007)), available at http://claad.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/2010_National_Strategy.pdf. 
 51. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Opioids Drive Continued 
Increase in Drug Overdose Deaths (Feb. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0220_drug_overdose _deaths.html. The CDC 
defines “epidemic” as “[t]he occurrence of more cases of disease than expected in a given 
area or among a specific group of people over a particular period of time.” Epidemiology 
Glossary, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductive
health/Data_Stats/Glossary.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2010). 
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pain relievers every year.52 In 2009, nearly 4.6 million emergency room vis-
its were drug related, approximately 1.2 million of which involved misuse or 
abuse of pharmaceuticals.53 In 2010, approximately 38,329 people died from 
drug overdoses in the United States.54 Approximately sixty percent of those 
“deaths (22,134) involved pharmaceutical drugs.”55 In comparison, firearms 
caused 31,672 deaths and motor vehicle accidents caused 35,332 deaths that 
year.56 
 
2010: Statistics on Causes of Death in the U.S.57 
Cause of Death Number of Deaths 
Total Drug Overdoses 38,329 
Pharmaceutical Drug Overdoses 22,134 
Illicit Drug Overdoses 16,195 
Car Crashes 35,332 
Firearms  31,672 
 
Many of these individuals have SUDs. SUDs are comparable to other 
chronic medical conditions, like hypertension and asthma, in terms of herit-
ability, etiology, pathophysiology, and response to treatment.58 
 
 52. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2010 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS (2011), 
available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/nsduh /2k10nsduh/2k10results.htm. 
 53. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE DAWN REPORT: 
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2009 DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK (DAWN) FINDINGS ON DRUG-
RELATED EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS (2010), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/
2k10/DAWN034/EDHighlights.htm. 
 54. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 51. 
 55. Id.; What are Opioids?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/
publications/research-reports/prescription-drugs/opioids/what-are-opioids (last visited Mar. 
20, 2014); see also Stewart B. Leavitt, Drug Overdose Deaths Still Rising in U.S., PAIN 
TREATMENT TOPICS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://updates.pain-topics.org/2013/02/drug-overdose-
deaths-still-rising-in-us.html (stating that of those 16,651 deaths involving opioids, 4903 
were the result of opioid use alone and the rest of the deaths involved a combination of opi-
oids and alcohol, other prescription medications, or illicit drugs). 
 56. Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH 
STAT. NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 1, 40–41, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf. 
 57. Murphy et al., supra note 56, at 40–41; Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, supra note 51. 
 58. Shelly F. Greenfield et al., Treatment for Substance Use Disorders in a Privately 
Insured Population Under Managed Care: Costs and Services Use, 27 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT 265 (2004). “[H]eritability is defined as the amount of variability within a group 
that can be explained by genetic differences.” Helen C. Harton & Martin J. Bourgeois, Cul-
tural Elements Emerge from Dynamic Social Impact, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CULTURE 41, 57 (Mark Schaller & Christian S. Crandall eds., 2004). Etiology is a “branch 
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Effective treatments are available for SUDs. For instance, medication-
assisted treatment (MAT) is used to treat opioid use disorders. MAT refers 
to “any treatment for [an SUD] that includes a medication . . . approved by 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)” as part of a comprehensive 
treatment plan.59 An ultimate goal of MAT is patient recovery and full social 
function.60 Recent studies show that SUD treatments, such as MAT, result in 
substantial benefits, including reduction in illicit substance use,61 improved 
psychiatric status, greater social adjustment, increased functional state and 
quality of life, decreased costs of hospital and emergency room services, 
reduced likelihood of overdose and death, and lower criminality.62 Neverthe-
 
of medicine which deals with the causes or origins of disease.” IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE 
SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENCE OF MEMORY 81 (1995). Pathophysiology is 
defined as “the physiology of disordered function.” Raymond Blessey, Epidemiology, Risk 
Factors, and Pathophysiology of Ischemic Heart Disease, 65 PHYSICAL THERAPY 1796, 1800 
(1985) (quoting DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1981)). 
 59. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., MEDICATION-ASSISTED 
TREATMENT FOR OPIOID ADDICTION IN OPIOID TREATMENT PROGRAMS: A TREATMENT 
IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL: TIP 43, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.asam.org/docs/
advocacy/samhsa_tip43_matforopioidaddiction.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
 60. Pharmacotherapy for Substance Use Disorders, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., http://dpt.samhsa.gov/medications/medsindex.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2014). 
 61. As used herein, the term “substance use” includes the consumption of an illicit sub-
stance or an analog thereof, prescription medication misuse and abuse, and alcohol abuse. It 
excludes taking medications as prescribed by a physician. Analogs, or designer drugs, are 
substances composed of the “compounds that produce the ‘high’ or euphoria of controlled 
substances, . . . but that are chemically different.” Designer Drugs: The Analog Game, 
NARCOTIC EDUC. FOUND. AM., https://www.cnoa.org/documents/NDESIGNER.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2014). They are typically manufactured in order to avoid governance by the 
Controlled Substances Act, Id.; however, the Federal Analog Act, a 1986 amendment to the 
Controlled Substances Act, states that any chemical “substantially similar” to a controlled 
substance listed in Schedule I or II will be treated as if it were also listed in those schedules, 
but only if intended for human consumption. 21 U.S.C. § 813 (2013). Often, analog drugs, 
such as “bath salts,” will have names that imply they are not intended to be consumed or will 
be labeled with “not intended for human consumption” in attempts to mask their intended 
purpose. “Prescription medication misuse” is the use of a medication for a medical purpose 
other than as directed or indicated, whether willful or unintentional, and whether harm results 
or not. “Prescription medication abuse” is the intentional self-administration of a medication 
for a nonmedical purpose, such as “getting high.” Katz et al., supra note 50, at 648. 
 62. E.g., John R.M. Caplehorn et al., Retention in Methadone Maintenance and Heroin 
Addicts’ Risk of Death, 89 ADDICTION 203 (1994); Shane Darke & Deborah Zador, Fatal 
Heroin “Overdose”: A Review, 91 ADDICTION 1765 (1996); Marina Davoli et al., Risk Fac-
tors for Overdose Mortality: A Case-Control Study Within a Cohort of Intravenous Drug 
Users, 22 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 273 (1993); Greenfield et al., supra note 57; L. Grönbladh 
et al., Mortality in Heroin Addiction: Impact of Methadone Treatment, 82 ACTA 
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 223 (1990); G.K. Hulse et al., The Quantification of Mortality 
Resulting from the Regular Use of Illicit Opiates, 94 ADDICTION 221 (1999); Mary Jeanne 
Kreek & Frank J. Vocci, History and Current Status of Opioid Maintenance Treatments: 
Blending Conference Session, 23 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 93 (2002); Miranda W. 
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less, access to such treatment has been historically limited due to stigma and 
cost.63 
C. Trend Toward Viewing Treatment as More Socially Acceptable 
Recent trends establish that access to SUD treatment is slowly expand-
ing. The American Medical Association (AMA) first identified alcoholism 
as a disease in 1956.64 In 1987, more than thirty years later, the AMA for-
mally added drug addiction to this classification.65 In 1970, Congress passed 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), a federal law regulating, among other 
things, the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances.66 After the 
passage of the CSA, physicians were allowed, for the first time, to prescribe 
the opioid medication methadone for treatment of opioid addiction.67 The 
Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (“DATA 2000”),68 enacted on Octo-
ber 17, 2000, as an amendment to the CSA, aimed to expand access to SUD 
treatment by integrating opioid detoxification and maintenance treatment 
into office-based medical practices in the United States.69 
More recently, federal agencies have adopted policies supporting SUD 
treatment. For example, in the Obama Administration’s 2013 National Drug 
Control Strategy, the Office of National Drug Control Policy has stated that 
“addiction treatment must be an integrated, accessible part of mainstream 
 
Langendam et al., The Impact of Harm-Reduction-Based Methadone Treatment on Mortality 
Among Heroin Users, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 774 (2001); Icro Maremmani et al., Substance 
Use and Quality of Life Over 12 Months Among Buprenorphine Maintenance-Treated and 
Methadone Maintenance-Treated Heroin-Addicted Patients, 33 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT 91 (2007); T.V. Parran et al., Long-Term Outcomes of Office-Based Buprenor-
phine/Naloxone Maintenance Therapy, 106 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 56 (2010); Rus-
sell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant 
Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171 (1986); D. Dwayne Simpson et al., Drug Abuse 
Treatment Retention and Process Effects on Follow-Up Outcomes, 47 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 227 (1997). 
 63. Miller & Swift, supra note 17, at 408–09; Schwartz, supra note 25. 
 64. Ken Roy & Michael Miller, Parity and the Medicalization of Addiction Treatment, 
42 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 115, 116 (2010). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–852 (2011)). 
 67. Id. §§ 202, 309. Opioids are a class of controlled substances that are typically pre-
scribed to treat pain. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites /default/files/rxreportfinalprint.pdf. Opioids 
reduce the intensity of pain signals that reach the brain and affect areas of the brain that con-
trol emotion, which diminishes the effects of a painful stimulus. Id. Medications that fall 
within this class include hydrocodone, oxycodone, morphine, and codeine. Id. 
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2) (2012); Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-310, tit. XXXV, 114 Stat. 1101, 1222−27. 
 69. See id. 
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health care.”70 The National Institute on Drug Abuse has taken the position 
that substance use treatment must be readily available, stating that 
“[p]otential patients can be lost if treatment is not immediately available or 
readily accessible.”71 In addition to the CSA, DATA 2000, and federal poli-
cies, two major laws were enacted to expand consumer access to SUD 
treatment in the past two decades: the Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
D. Legal Parity Requirements 
1. The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 
In 1992, a National Advisory Mental Health Council report found that 
mental illnesses are not only treatable but that treatments are cost-
effective.72 Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA) 
in an attempt to expand access to care.73 It offered partial parity by prohibit-
ing only group health plans74 that already offered mental health coverage 
from imposing annual and lifetime dollar limits that were greater than the 
limits imposed on coverage of physical illness.75 However, the MHPA was 
limited in scope and did “not compel insurers to provide mental health cov-
erage.”76 It also offered an exemption for employers with fifty or fewer em-
ployees.77 Moreover, the MHPA did not include coverage for SUD treat-
ment, even though statistics show that “roughly fifty percent of individuals 
with severe mental disorders are affected by [SUDs] . . . and fifty-three per-
cent of [people with SUDs] also have at least one serious mental illness.78 
 
 70. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 20 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-
research/ndcs_2013.pdf. 
 71. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 26, at 2. 
 72. RAMYA SUNDARARAMAN & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33820, THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.house.gov/sites/members/nc04 _price/issues/uploadedfiles/health3.pdf. 
 73. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2874, 
2944–51; SUNDARARAMAN & REDHEAD, supra note 72, at 1. 
 74. A group health plan is a plan, including an insured or a self-insured plan, of an em-
ployer or contributed to by an employer or employee organization to provide health care to 
employees, former employees, others associated or formerly associated with the employer in 
a business relationship, or their families, directly or through insurance, reimbursement or 
otherwise. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(a)(1) (2012). 
 75. SUNDARARAMAN & REDHEAD, supra note 72, at 1. Aside from dollar limitations, the 
MHPA did not prohibit any other forms of discrimination. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 8. 
 78. Sara Nadim, The 2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act: An Overview 
of the New Legislation and Why an Amendment Should Be Passed to Specifically Define 
Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 303–04 (2009). 
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2. The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 
The MHPA expired in 2007,79 and in 2008, President Bush signed the 
more comprehensive Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act into 
law as amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC).80 The Equity Act filled in some of the gaps that the MHPA left 
open. For instance, it explicitly extended coverage to include SUD bene-
fits.81 In particular, if group health plans offered medical and surgical bene-
fits as well as mental health or substance use disorder (MH/SUD) benefits, 
then financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to such 
MH/SUD benefits must be “no more restrictive” than the predominant fi-
nancial requirements and treatment limitations placed on “substantially all 
medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan.”82 Financial requirements 
include “deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expens-
es.”83 Treatment limitations include “limits on the frequency of treatment, 
number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits on the scope or 
duration of treatment.”84 
The Equity Act provided additional improvements over the MHPA. For 
instance, it limited cost-sharing, stating that there must be no separate cost-
sharing requirements or treatment limitations that are applicable only to 
MH/SUD benefits.85 Moreover, it requires health plans that provide out-of-
network coverage for medical and surgical benefits to also provide equal 
out-of-network coverage for MH/SUD benefits.86 Additionally, the Equity 
Act expanded parity to benefits in Medicaid MCO plans to an extent, as 
discussed below.87 
 
 79. See SUNDARARAMAN & REDHEAD, supra note 72, at 10–11. 
 80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); Nadim, supra note 78, at 306; see also Paul Well-
stone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, Title V(B), 
122 Stat. 3765, 3881–93. 
 81. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1). 
 82. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(A). 
 83. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(i). 
 84. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 85. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(A). Cost sharing, or the share of costs between the patient and the 
insurer, includes patients’ out-of-pocket expenditures on deductibles, copayments, coinsur-
ance, direct expenditures for health care services, equipment, and supplies, and anything else 
that is not covered by insurance, excluding premiums. Paul W. Newacheck & Sue E. Kim, A 
National Profile of Health Care Utilization and Expenditures for Children with Special 
Health Care Needs, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 10, 11 (2005), available 
at http://archpedi.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=485899. 
 86. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(5). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(8) (2012); CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., supra note 41, at 2; infra Part III.A.4. 
2014] ACHIEVING REAL PARITY 567 
Despite its improvements, the Equity Act also has disconcerting limita-
tions. For instance, it does not mandate coverage of MH/SUD benefits; only 
plans that choose to offer coverage of MH/SUDs must offer equivalent cov-
erage.88 The Equity Act also does not apply to small-employer plans, de-
fined as those with fifty or fewer employees, nor does it apply to individual 
plans.89 Additionally, it provides a cost exemption: if a plan or issuer makes 
changes in order to comply with the Equity Act and incurs an increased cost 
of at least 2% in the first year that the Equity Act applies or incurs an in-
creased cost of at least 1% in any subsequent plan year, then a plan or issuer 
may claim an exemption from the requirements of the Equity Act based on 
its increased costs.90 A plan or issuer is exempt from the Equity Act’s re-
quirements for the plan or policy year following the year the cost was in-
curred.91 
3. The Equity Act Regulations 
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and the Employee Benefits Security Administration 
of the Department of Labor (DOL) promulgated an interim final rule for the 
Equity Act on February 2, 2010 (“Interim Regulations”).92 These Interim 
Regulations expanded the definition of treatment limitations to include both 
quantitative and non-quantitative treatment limitations (NQTLs).93 Quantita-
tive treatment limitations are defined as limitations that are “expressed nu-
merically (such as 50 outpatient visits per year).”94 They include “frequency 
of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, days in a waiting period, or 
other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment.”95 NQTLs are de-
 
 88. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b). 
 89. Id. § 1185a(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
 90. Id. § 1185a(c)(2)(A)–(B); The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://cms.hhs.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-
Initiatives/Other-Insurance-Protections/mhpaea_factsheet.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 91. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2)(A). “The plan sponsors or issuers must notify the plan 
beneficiaries that MHPAEA does not apply to their coverage. These exemptions last one 
year. After that, the plan or coverage is required to comply again; however, if the plan or 
coverage incurs an increased cost of at least one percent in that plan or policy year, the plan 
or coverage could claim the exemption for the following plan or policy year.” The Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 89. 
 92. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712 (2013); Interim Final Rules to Implement the Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 Go into Effect on April 5, 2010, CENTER FOR 
MEDICARE ADVOC., http://www.medicareadvocacy .org/interim-final-rules-to-implement-the-
mental-health-parity-and-addiction-equity-act-of-2008-go-into-effect-on-april-5-2010/ (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 93. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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fined as limitations that are not expressed numerically, but “otherwise limit 
the scope or duration of benefits for treatment.”96 The Interim Regulations 
provided a list of examples of methods that may be considered NQTLs, such 
as standards for determining medical necessity; preauthorization require-
ments; formulary design; “refusal to pay for higher-cost therapies until it can 
be shown that a lower-cost therapy is not effective (also known as fail-first 
policies or step therapy protocols)”; network standards for provider reim-
bursement; and “exclusions based on failure to complete a course of treat-
ment.”97 The Interim Regulations stated: 
A group health plan . . . that provides both medical/surgical benefits and 
[MH/SUD] benefits may not apply any financial requirement or treat-
ment limitation to [MH/SUD] benefits in any classification that is more 
restrictive than the predominant financial requirement or treatment limi-
tation of that type applied to substantially all medical/surgical benefits in 
the same classification.
98
 
The classifications for which the Interim Regulations applied were ex-
plicitly limited to inpatient, in-network; inpatient, out-of-network; outpa-
tient, in-network; outpatient, out-of-network; emergency care; and prescrip-
tion drugs.99 Financial or quantitative treatment limitations are applied to 
“substantially all medical/surgical benefits in a classification of benefits if 
[the limitation] applies to at least two-thirds of all medical/surgical benefits 
in that classification.”100 The level of the financial or quantitative treatment 
limitation is considered “predominant” if the level “applies to more than 
one-half of medical/surgical benefits in that classification subject to the fi-
nancial requirement or quantitative treatment limitations.”101 
The Interim Regulations used a different test to measure a violation of 
NQTL standards (“Comparable Test”) than they used for a violation of 
quantitative treatment limitation standards: 
A group health plan . . . may not impose a[n NQTL] with respect to 
[MH/SUD] benefits in any classification unless, under the terms of the plan . 
. . as written and in operation, any processes, strategies, evidentiary stand-
ards, or other factors used in applying the [NQTL] to [MH/SUD] benefits in 
the classification are comparable to, and are applied no more stringently 
than, the processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in 
 
 96. Id. § 2590.712(a), (c)(4)(ii). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 2590.712(c)(2)(i). 
 99. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A). 
 100. Id. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)(A). 
 101. Id. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)(B)(1). 
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applying the limitation with respect to medical surgical/benefits in the clas-
sification.”102 
Although the term “comparable” was not defined, the Interim Regula-
tions provided some examples of processes used in applying NQTLs that are 
“not comparable.”103 For instance, a concurrent review process, which is the 
“review or authorization for procedures or services during the time such 
services are being rendered,” is not comparable to the retrospective review 
process, which is the “review of services after they have been rendered.”104 
The Interim Regulations also included disclosure requirements.105 For 
example, insurers must make available upon request the criteria for medical 
necessity determinations106 regarding MH/SUD benefits to any current or 
potential participant, beneficiary, or contracting provider.107 Insurers must 
also provide the reason for any denial of reimbursement or payment for 
MH/SUD services within a reasonable timeframe to participants and benefi-
ciaries upon request.108 
Despite their improvements in clarifying some of the ambiguities of the 
Equity Act, the Interim Regulations created some troubling ambiguities and 
loopholes. For instance, the Interim Regulations did not define the scope of 
services or continuum of care for beneficiaries of MH/SUD services.109 
“Scope of services generally refers to the types of treatment and treatment 
settings that are covered by a [health insurance plan].”110 Instead of enumer-
 
 102. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i). 
 103. Id. § 2950.712(c)(4)(iii). 
 104. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(iii) (Example 1); Janet Lerman, Medical Practice Strategies: 
Systems Based Practice - Business Laws Ethics, Utilization Review - Class 5, MEDICAL 
PRACTICE CME.COM, http://www.medicalpracticecme.com/Class%205/Articles%20for%20
class%205/article%201%20class%205.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 105. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(d). 
 106. Access to health services in private, federal, and state health insurance plans can 
depend in part on whether the service provided is considered a medical necessity. Morris A. 
Landau, The Difficulties in Defining Medical Necessity, U. HOUS. L. CENTER (Nov. 29, 2000), 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/Managed /001129Difficulties.html. In general 
terms, “medical necessity” refers to the legal authority of a managed care organization, a 
Medicaid agency, or other purchaser of health care to determine whether a specific service 
will be covered in a specific situation. Id. The particular definition of “medical necessi-
ty” varies depending upon whether providers, physicians, courts, government insurers, pri-
vate insurers, or consumers are using the term. Id. 
 107. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(d)(1) . 
 108. Id. § 2590.712(d)(2)(a)(4). 
 109. Id. § 2590.712 ; AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, SPECIAL REPORT: MHPAEA 
REGULATIONS, PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND 
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT INTERIM FINAL RULE 6 (2010), available at http://www.ahpnet.
com/communications/documents/EquityActIFRAnalysisMarch2010LAC.aspx. 
 110. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68246 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
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ating which types of treatment and treatment settings should be covered, the 
Interim Regulations stated that group health plans could define which ser-
vices were covered in MH/SUD benefit packages, so long as those defini-
tions were consistent with “generally recognized independent standards of 
current medical practice.”111 By way of example of “generally recognized 
independent standards,” the Interim Regulations stated that current versions 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD), or state guidelines could be 
used in defining covered services; but the Interim Regulations also made it 
clear that other standards could be used.112 Moreover, parity with non-
MH/SUD benefit packages was limited to only six classifications.113 Like 
scope of services standards, these six classifications were not defined and 
were left to health plans and state health insurance laws to define.114 
Furthermore, while the “substantially all/predominant” test was used 
for financial and quantitative limitations, there was no threshold test for 
NQTLs.115 Instead, the Comparable Test was used to determine whether 
processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, and other factors, as applied to 
MH/SUD benefits, were in fact NQTLs.116 However, this test was problem-
atic because, as the Interim Regulations acknowledged, there may be differ-
ent clinical standards used for medical/surgical benefits that are incompara-
ble to those used for MH/SUD benefits.117 For example, as a result, insurers 
often covered skilled nursing facilities for medical/surgical care but exclud-
ed residential treatment for MH/SUD care—arguing that such benefits are 
not comparable because residential care does not require a nursing staff.118 
In attempts to clear up ambiguities and close loopholes, the IRS, DOL, 
and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued Final 
Rules for the Equity Act (“Final Regulations” or “Final Rule”) on Novem-
ber 13, 2013, which apply to both grandfathered and non-grandfathered 
health plans.119 In addition to the six prior classifications of care for which 
 
 111. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a) (2013); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note 108, at 
6. 
 112. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68242; 29 C.F.R § 2590.712(a). 
 113. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note 109, at 
6. 
 114. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note 109, at 
6. 
 115. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3)–(4). 
 116. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4). 
 117. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(iii) (Example 4); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note 
109, at 7. 
 118. See, e.g., Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 703–06 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 119. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68240–41 & n.2 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be 
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parity must be achieved under the Equity Act,120 the Final Regulations creat-
ed two sub-classifications for SUD care that must also receive parity: 
“[o]ffice visits (such as physician visits), and [a]ll other outpatient items and 
services [separate from office visits] (such as outpatient surgery, facility 
charges for day treatment centers, laboratory charges, or other medical 
items).”121 They stated that these “classifications and sub-classifications are 
intended to be comprehensive and cover the complete range of medi-
cal/surgical benefits and [MH/SUD] benefits offered by health plans and 
issuers;” thereby making it clear that MH/SUD services have to be compa-
rable to the range and types of services for medical/surgical treatment within 
each class.122 Furthermore, it clarified that if a plan provides coverage for 
one classification, it must provide coverage for all classifications and sub-
classifications.123 However, plans that offer MH/SUD benefits do not have 
to provide coverage for all disorders and disabilities; for example, a plan 
could offer coverage for alcohol dependence but not drug dependence.124 
Additionally, although the Final Regulations do not define the scope of 
care that plans must offer, they do state that plans must offer intermediate 
care, including partial hospitalization, residential care, office visits and all 
other outpatient services, such as outpatient surgery, facility charges for day 
treatment centers, laboratory charges, or other medical items, in parity with 
such care offered for medical/surgical needs.125 Furthermore, the Final 
Regulations stated that plans and issuers can look at an array of factors in 
determining reimbursement rates for the scope of services, such as service 
types, geographic market, demand for services, supply of providers, provid-
er practice size, Medicare rates, training, experience, and licensure of pro-
viders; but all of these factors must be applied to MH/SUD services compa-
 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). The rules apply to 
plan years beginning on or after July 1, 2014. Id. 
 120. These classifications include inpatient, in-network; inpatient, out-of-network; outpa-
tient, in-network; outpatient, out-of-network; emergency care; and prescription drugs. 29 
C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2013). 
 121. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(iii)(C) (2013). 
 122. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68243; Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., http://www.asam.org/advocacy/parity (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2014). 
 123. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(2)(ii)(A). 
 124. However, as described below, a plan may still be required to cover additional sub-
stance use disorder treatment under the ACA. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete 
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246–47. 
 125. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(iii)(C); Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete 
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246. 
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rably and no more stringently than they are applied to medical/surgical ser-
vices.126 
Additionally, the Final Rule acknowledged that insurers frequently 
abused the exception that allowed them to place discriminatory NQTLs on 
MH/SUD treatment based on a “recognized clinically appropriate standard 
of care”—thereby using this exception to deny coverage.127 As such, the 
Final Rule removed this exception.128 It clarified that plans and issuers 
would still “have the flexibility . . . to take into account clinically appropri-
ate standards of care when determining whether and to what extent medical 
management techniques and other NQTLs apply to medical/surgical benefits 
and [MH/SUD benefits],” as long as they apply the Comparable Test in do-
ing so.129 
Moreover, many plans attempted to place NQTLs on MH/SUD bene-
fits, arguing that such NQTLs were permitted as long as they were not spe-
cifically mentioned in the Interim Regulations’ list of NQTL examples.130 
As a result, the Final Regulations clearly stated that the list of specific 
NQTLs was an illustrative list and that all NQTLs, even if not named specif-
ically, are regulated, including “prior authorization and concurrent review, 
service coding, provider network criteria, policy coverage conditions, and 
both in- and out-of-network geographical limitations.”131 
However, just like the Interim Regulations, the Final Regulations also 
created some ambiguities and did not resolve all problems. For instance, the 
Interim Regulations did not address the scope of services that must be cov-
ered within specific classifications, allowing insurers to refuse to offer in-
termediate services, such as residential care.132 The Final Regulations con-
tinued to refuse to name specific services that must achieve parity. Instead, 
the Final Regulations deferred to states to define the package of insurance 
benefits that must be provided as essential health benefits.133 The Final Rule 
did note that intermediate care must be covered, including MH/SUD resi-
dential care if the plan offered skilled nursing facilities or rehabilitation hos-
pitals as inpatient medical/surgical benefits; in addition, the Final Rule re-
quired intensive outpatient MH/SUD services and partial hospitalization as 
outpatient services if a plan treated home health care as a medical/surgical 
 
 126. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246. 
 127. Id. at 68245. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Id. at 68245–46. 
 131. Id. at 68246. 
 132. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246. 
 133. Id. 
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outpatient benefit.134 Lastly, instead of creating a quantitative formula for 
applying NQTLs, the Final Regulations kept the Comparable Test for 
NQTLs without defining the term “comparable and no more stringently.”135 
4. State Parity Laws 
State legislators began enacting some form of parity legislation twenty 
years before the MHPA was enacted,136 and as of 2012, forty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia had enacted some form of parity laws.137 The Equi-
ty Act continues to protect states’ rights to enact their own parity laws as 
long as they are equal to or more stringent than the requirements under the 
federal law.138 Most states have implemented one of three parity require-
ments: voluntary participation, minimum coverage, and mandatory and 
equivalent coverage.139 Voluntary participation does not require benefits to 
be provided at all.140 Instead, it either requires the insurer to provide optional 
coverage for MH/SUD, or it can require that if MH/SUD benefits are of-
fered, then they must be equal to medical/surgical benefits.141 For instance, 
the Equity Act is a voluntary participation statute because it does not require 
large group health plans to offer MH/SUD benefits, but if they choose to do 
so, then they must offer parity between MH/SUD benefits and medi-
cal/surgical benefits. 
Minimum coverage requires insurers to provide some level of coverage 
for mental illnesses, SUDs, or some combination thereof.142 This is an in-
termediate parity requirement because it allows for discrepancies in the level 
of MH/SUD benefits as compared to medical/surgical benefits.143 These 
 
 134. Id. at 68247. 
 135. See id. at 68244–45. 
 136. GAIL K. ROBINSON ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., 
STATE MANDATES FOR TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS 6–8 
(2007), available at http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA07-4228/SMA07-4228-A.pdf. 
 137. See ECRI Inst., Mental Health Parity Laws and Their Impact on Insurance Benefits, 
BULIMIA NERVOSA RESOURCE GUIDE, http://www.bulimiaguide.org/summary/detail.aspx?doc
_id=9470 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE MENTAL 
HEALTH PARITY LAWS 2–15 (2009), available at http://www.nami.org/Content/Content
Groups/Policy/Issues_Spotlights/Parity1/State_Parity_Chart_0709.pdf. Wyoming was the 
only state that lacked a parity law by 2012. Id. 
 138. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68252. 
 139. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 1; see also State Laws Mandating or Regu-
lating Mental Health Benefits, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx (last updated Jan. 2014). 
 140. State Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits, supra note 138. 
 141. Id. 
 142. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 136, at 1. 
 143. State Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits, supra note 139. 
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discrepancies may include “different visit limits, copayments, deductibles, 
and annual and lifetime limits.”144 
Mandatory and equivalent coverage is the most stringent level of parity 
because it requires coverage of mental illnesses, SUDs, or a combination of 
the two, and it prohibits insurers from discriminating between coverage by 
requiring insurers to provide the same level of MH/SUD benefits as medi-
cal/surgical benefits.145 For example, Vermont, which is a mandatory and 
equivalent coverage state, requires comprehensive parity without exclusions, 
stating that “[a] health insurance plan shall provide coverage for treatment 
of a mental [health] condition.” 146 Substance use is included in Vermont’s 
definition of “mental [health] condition.”147 
While thirty-two states require either mandatory and equivalent cover-
age or minimum coverage, only twenty-nine states require coverage of 
SUDs.148 In 2003, small employers started claiming “that the steady rise in 
insurance costs was preventing them from offering additional coverage” and 
“that a contributing factor was the increasing number of required bene-
fits.”149 In response, state lawmakers “began . . . enacting legislation that 
waived or provided exemptions from [s]tate [parity] mandates” so insurers 
could offer reduced or “bare-bones” health insurance policies.150 Some states 
have placed certain restrictions on, or granted exemptions to, the voluntary 
participation requirements, such as waiving the mandate for small employ-
ers or waiving the mandate if premium cost would increase once the benefit 
is added.151 For example, in Utah, small employer insurance providers must 
provide SUD benefits, but coverage “may include a restriction on cost shar-
ing factors, such as deductibles, copayments, or coinsurance, before reach-
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(c) (2012). The statute further states: 
A health insurance plan shall provide coverage for treatment of a mental condi-
tion and shall: (1) not establish any rate, term, or condition that places a greater 
burden on an insured for access to treatment for a mental condition than for ac-
cess to treatment for other health conditions . . . ; (2) not exclude from its net-
work or list of authorized providers any licensed mental health or substance 
abuse provider located within the geographic coverage area of  the health benefit 
plan if the provider is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation 
established by the health insurer; and (3) make any deductible or out-of-pocket 
limits required under a health insurance plan comprehensive for coverage of both 
mental and physical health conditions. 
Id. 
 147. Id. § 4089b(b)(2). 
 148. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 136, at 41. 
 149. Id. at 8. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 40. 
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ing a maximum out-of-pocket limit.”152 In these states, more comprehensive 
insurance parity laws are needed.153 
E. The Affordable Care Act Expands Health Coverage 
On March 23, 2010, the ACA was signed into law,154 and as a result, 
approximately 24 million individuals, including 6 million individuals with 
mental health disorders or SUDs, are expected to gain health insurance cov-
erage by 2016.155 The legislation seeks to achieve this goal in five broad 
ways: (1) by providing citizens with subsidies to pay premiums and out-of-
pocket expenses, (2) by expanding state Medicaid programs, (3) by prohibit-
ing discrimination based on age or medical condition, (4) by instituting an 
individual mandate, and (5) by instituting employer mandates and financial 
incentives for employers to provide health insurance to their employees.156 
The individual mandate requires virtually all U.S. citizens and legal resi-
dents to obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage or pay a finan-
cial penalty for noncompliance.157 As of January 1, 2014, individuals and 
qualified employers may purchase health insurance through American 
Health Benefit Exchanges (“Exchanges”).158 The employer mandate requires 
 
 152. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-625(1)(a)(ii), (3)(b) (West 2012). 
 153. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 154. Ryan Sugden, Note, Sick and (Still) Broke: Why the Affordable Care Act Won’t End 
Medical Bankruptcy, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 441, 456–57 (2012). 
 155. See The Uninsured and the Difference Health Insurance Makes, HENRY J. KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/the-uninsured-and-the-
difference-health-insurance/. Prior to the ACA there were approximately 47.9 uninsured 
individuals in the United States. Id. 25% of uninsured individuals have a mental health condi-
tion or substance use disorder. Kristen Boronio et al., Affordable Care Act Expands Mental 
Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits and Federal Parity Protections for 62 Million 
Americans, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION (Feb. 20, 2013), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/
mental/rb_mental.cfm. By 2016, the number of uninsured individuals is expected to decrease 
by half. The Uninsured and the Difference Health Insurance Makes, (2012). 
 156. Sugden, supra note 154, at 442, 458; The Uninsured and the Difference Health 
Insurance Makes, supra note 155. 
 157. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (c)–(d) (2012). Individuals will be required to pay the greater 
of a fixed amount or a percentage of income. Id. § 5000A(c)(2). The fixed penalty is $95 in 
2014, and it increases to $695 by 2016. Id. § 5000A(c)(3).The income-based penalty is 1% of 
income in 2014, and it increases to 2.5% by 2016. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B). 
 158. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Quali-
fied Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,310 (Mar. 27, 
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 156 & 157); 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2012). A 
qualified employer is defined as a small employer that elects to make all of its full-time em-
ployees eligible for one or more qualified health plans offered in the small group market 
through an Exchange that offers qualified health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(2)(A) (2012). 
The term “qualified health plan” is defined below. See infra text accompanying notes 160–
62. 
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large employers159 to offer coverage to employees or pay a fee for each em-
ployee who receives a premium tax credit for opting into Exchanges.160 
When the ACA is fully implemented,161 it will expand access to health 
insurance coverage for SUDs by requiring some level of coverage for sub-
stance use benefits in small group plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, 
and Medicaid plans.162 Insurers that offer “non-grandfathered163 health insur-
ance coverage in the individual or small group markets”164 are now required 
to offer “Essential Health Benefits” (EHBs),165 including benefits for 
MH/SUDs.166 The ACA builds on the Equity Act by making MH/SUD ser-
 
 159. Although the ACA defines a large employer as one who “employed an average of at 
least 101 employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at 
least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year,” a state may elect to treat businesses with 
fifty employees or less as small businesses until 2016. 42 U.S.C. § 18024(b)(1), (3) (2012); 
The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 90. 
 160. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012). Exchanges are competitive marketplaces for health 
insurance provided by states or the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b); Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Ex-
change Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 18, 310. 
 161. Most of the major reforms contained in the ACA begin to take effect in January 
2014, and gradually increase until about 2020. See generally Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Health Care and Education Recon-
ciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029; Mary Agnes Carey & Jenny Gold, 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., After the Election: A Consumer’s Guide to the Health Law, 
BLACK AIDS INST., https://www.blackaids.org/news-2012/1431-after-the-election-a-
consumers-guide-to-the-health-law (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
 162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u-7(b)(2)(A), 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(3) 
(2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(2)(i) (2013); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; 
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation,, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 12,834, 12,843–44 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156). 
 163. A grandfathered health plan is one that existed on March 23, 2010, and in which the 
employer or insurer has not made any significant changes to the plan’s benefits or how much 
members pay through premiums, copays, or deductibles. 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(a), (g) (2013). 
 164. “Small group market[s] [are] health insurance market[s] under which individuals 
obtain health insurance coverage (directly or through any arrangement) on behalf of them-
selves (and their dependents) through a group health plan maintained . . . by a small employ-
er.” 42 U.S.C. § 18024(a)(3). A small employer is one who has “employed an average of at 
least 1 but not more than 100 employees on business days during the preceding calendar year 
and who employs at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year.” Id. § 18024(b)(2). 
 165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(a)–(b)(1), 18032(c)(1)–(2) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.150(a) 
(2013). 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E). EHBs include the following ten health care service 
categories that must be covered in non-grandfathered health insurance plans: 
 Ambulatory patient services 
 Emergency services 
 Hospitalization 
 Maternity and newborn care 
 Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral 
health treatment 
 Prescription drugs 
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vices an EHB that must be covered in non-grandfathered health insurance 
plans.167 The ACA directed the Secretary of HHS to ensure that EHBs are 
provided such that there is an appropriate balance between each type of ben-
efit.168 The Secretary determined that to offer adequate coverage of 
MH/SUD services as a category of EHBs, insurers must meet the same 
standards as in the Equity Act.169 
The ACA also requires that Exchanges offer qualified health plans 
(QHPs).170 A QHP is, among other things, a certified health plan that pro-
vides EHBs, is offered by a licensed health insurance issuer, offers certain 
levels of quality coverage,171 and charges the same premium rate for plans 
offered through the Exchange as the rate for plans offered directly from the 
issuer.172 Given that plans on the Exchanges must offer QHPs, and QHPs 
must include coverage of EHBs, Exchange plans are consequently required 
to offer at least minimum coverage of substance use benefits. 
The ACA explicitly expanded parity coverage under the Equity Act to 
ABPs.173 The ACA amended the Social Security Act to now require that if a 
 
 Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices 
 Laboratory services 
 Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management 
 Pediatric services, including oral and vision care 
Id. § 18022(b)(1). 
 167. The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 89. 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(A). 
 169. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health 
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,843 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to 
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156). 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2) (2012). 
 171. The ACA’s levels of coverage are designed to provide benefits that are actuarially 
equivalent to a certain percentage of the full actuarial value of the benefits provided under the 
plan. For instance, the Bronze Level provides benefits equivalent to 60%, the Silver Level 
provides benefits equivalent to 70%, the Gold Level provides benefits equivalent to 80%, and 
the Platinum Level provides benefits equivalent to 90% of the full actuarial value of benefits 
provided under the plan. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1). 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1) (2012). 
 173. Id. § 1396u-7(b)(5)–(6) (2012); see Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
grams: Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair Hear-
ing and Appeal Processes, and Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges: Eligibility and En-
rollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160, 42,160 (July 15, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 
435, 436, 438, 440, 447 & 457; 45 C.F.R. pts. 155 & 156). “Benchmark” means that the 
benefits are at least equal to one of the four statutorily specified plans. The four benchmark 
plans are: (1) The Standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield Preferred Provider Option offered 
through the Federal Employees Health Benefit program (“FEHBP”); (2) State employee 
coverage that is offered and generally available to state employees (“State Employee Cover-
age”); (3) The commercial HMO with the largest insured commercial, non-Medicaid enroll-
ment in the state (“Commercial HMO”); and (4) Secretary-approved coverage, which can 
include the Medicaid state plan-benefit package offered in that state. “Benchmark-
equivalent” means that the benefits include certain specified services, and the overall benefits 
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Medicaid ABP, as distinguished from a Medicaid managed care plan, “pro-
vides both [medical/surgical and MH/SUD] benefits, the entity shall ensure 
that the financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to such 
mental health or substance use disorder benefits comply with the require-
ments of [the Equity Act] in the same manner as such requirements apply to 
a group health plan.”174 Moreover, although the Final Rule of the Equity Act 
does not apply to ABPs, CMS guidance, which governs ABPs, requires 
ABPs to comply with the majority of the Final Rule.175 CMS guidance states 
that all ABPs must comply with financial requirements, prohibitions on 
treatment limitations (both quantitative and non-quantitative), out-of-
network coverage requirements, and availability of information regarding 
both medical necessity determinations and reasons for denial of reimburse-
ment or payment for services.176 
Large employers are not required to offer EHBs to their employees. In-
stead, they must offer “minimum value” care (which is commonly referred 
to as “adequate” care) or risk facing a penalty if one of their employees re-
ceives a premium tax credit by opting to use the Exchange.177 A plan fails to 
provide minimum value care if the plan’s share of the total allowed costs of 
benefits provided is less than sixty percent of the costs.178 
In sum, under the ACA, non-grandfathered small group plans, individ-
ual plans, Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs must offer SUD benefits, 
and such plans must offer parity between MH/SUD coverage and medi-
cal/surgical coverage.179 Non-grandfathered small group plans and individu-
al plans must offer EHBs.180 Exchange plans and Medicaid ABPs must offer 
 
are at least actuarially equivalent to one of the statutorily specified benchmark coverage 
packages. CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 1–2. 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(6)(A). 
 175. CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 2. 
 176. See id. (“The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) applies to 
Alternatives Benefit.”). 
 177. 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(c)(2)(C), 4980H(b)(1) (2012); Minimum Value of Eligible Em-
ployer-Sponsored Plans and Other Rules Regarding the Health Insurance Premium Tax Cred-
it, 78 Fed. Reg. 25,909, 25,909 (proposed May 3, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 178. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii). The “[p]ercentage of the total allowed costs” provided 
under a group health plan is defined as “[(1)] the anticipated covered medical spending for 
EHB coverage . . . paid by a health plan for a standard population, [(2)] computed in accord-
ance with the plan’s cost-sharing, [and (3)] divided by the total anticipated allowed charges 
for EHB coverage provided to a standard population.” 45 C.F.R. § 156.20 (2013). The stand-
ard population used for this computation “must reflect the population covered by [typical] 
self-insured group health plans.” 45 C.F.R. § 156.145(c) (2013). For the definition of “group 
health plan,” see supra Part I.D.1. 
 179. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(j) (2012). 
 180. FAQs about Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XVIII) and Mental Health 
Parity Implementation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-aca18.html#
footnotes (last updated Jan. 9, 2014). 
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QHPs,181 and, consequently, must offer EHBs as well.182 Under the ACA, all 
QHPs must comply with the Equity Act,183 and both the ACA regulations 
and the Equity Act regulations explicitly state that all plans that offer EHBs 
must comply with the Equity Act regulations in order to satisfy the require-
ment to cover EHBs.184 Therefore, although the Equity Act states that it ap-
plies only to large group plans, the ACA expanded federal parity to those 
plans offering EHBs: non-grandfathered small group plans, individual plans, 
Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs.185 
Such expansion partially closes one major loophole in the Equity Act 
by ensuring that certain plans must provide benefits for SUDs and such ben-
efits must be administered in parity with those offered for medical/surgical 
treatment.186 In doing so, using the categorical terminology of state parity 
laws, the ACA converted the Equity Act from a voluntary coverage law to a 
mandatory and equivalent coverage law for non-grandfathered small group 
plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs. And although 
large group plans and Medicaid MCO plans are not required to offer SUD 
benefits, if they voluntarily offer such benefits, they must still provide equi-
table coverage under the Equity Act. 
II. COMMON RESTRICTIONS ON SUD TREATMENT 
Even with the enactment of the Equity Act, its Final Regulations, the 
ACA, and state parity laws, many insurers still place significant obstacles in 
the way of SUD benefits. For instance, a recent report by the American So-
ciety of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) found that most state Medicaid plans 
and many private insurance policies place heavy restrictions on access to 
MAT and the medications used in MAT.187 Many of these restrictions vio-
 
 181. Id. § 18031(d)(2). 
 182. See Id. § 18021(a)(1)(B). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(j). 
 184. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68240–41 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and 
Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,844 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 
147, 155 & 156). 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(iv) (2012); Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and 
Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
68248. For a refresher on ABPs, please see supra Part II.A.2. 
 186. 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(3) (2013). 
 187. Suzanne Gelber Rinaldo & David W. Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, Availability With-
out Accessibility? State Medicaid Coverage and Authorization Requirements for Opioid 
Dependence Medications, in ADVANCING ACCESS TO ADDICTION MEDICATIONS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT 6, 10–11 (Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med. ed., 2013), 
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late the Equity Act, its Final Regulations, and the ACA. This section dis-
cusses ways in which private insurers and state Medicaid programs have 
created barriers to access, and this section analyzes how such barriers are 
violations of the Equity Act and the ACA. Currently, most case law pertain-
ing to parity deals with denials of MH benefits, so this section will draw 
parallels between those cases and denials of SUD treatment coverage. 
A. Medical Necessity 
Insurers have medical necessity guidelines, which are based on “gener-
ally accepted treatments that meet . . . community standards of care” and are 
used to determine whether to grant coverage of a particular service.188 All 
too often, individuals are denied access to MH/SUD benefits because insur-
ers implement their own vague medical necessity standards, leading to une-
qual coverage for treatment.189 
For instance, in Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,190 the fa-
ther of a four-year-old boy with autism filed a class action suit against the 
defendant insurer pursuant to California’s Mental Health Parity Act.191 The 
California Mental Health Parity Act is a minimum coverage plan because it 
obligates health plans to provide coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of 
mental illnesses.192 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant denied coverage 
for certain therapies for autism spectrum disorders “on the grounds that the 
therapies are ‘non-health care services,’ ‘academic or educational interven-
tions,’ or ‘custodial care’” rather than determining that those therapies were 
not medically necessary.193 The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant could 
not categorically deny “coverage for mental health care services that may . . 
. be medically necessary” on the basis that the therapies are not “health care 
services”194 without considering whether such services are, in fact, medically 
 
available at http://www.asam.org/docs/advocacy/Implications-for-Opioid-Addiction-
Treatment. For a refresher on MAT, please see supra Part II.B. 
 188. Benefiting from Mental Health Parity, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, Jan. 2009, 
available at http://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletters/Harvard_Mental_Health_Letter/2009/
January/Benefiting_from_mental_health_parity. 
 189. Letter from Representatives of the Cal. Coal. for Whole Health to Peter Lee, Exec. 
Dir., & Diana Dooley, Chair, Cal. Health Benefit Exch. 1 (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://
www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/breaking%20news/1210_october/ccwh%20co
mments%20to%20hbex%20on%20consumer%20assistance%20program%2010-26-12.pdf. 
 190. 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 191. Id. at 552–53. 
 192. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(a) (West 2002). 
 193. Arce, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565. 
 194. Under California’s mental health parity laws, insurers are not required to cover rou-
tine patient care costs that are not health care services. CAL. INS. CODE § 1374.72 (West 
2013). (discussing a federal district court finding that federal law preempted California’s 
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necessary for its individual plan members.195 Therefore, if the reasoning of 
this case was extended to all state and federal plans, insurers offering mini-
mum coverage and mandatory and equivalent coverage plans violate parity 
laws when they fail to inquire as to whether the care is medically necessary, 
and also when they wrongfully deny care that was medically necessary for 
MH/SUD diagnosis or treatment.196 
Moreover, had the facts of Arce occurred after the Equity Act Final 
Regulations were implemented, the plaintiffs could have argued under fed-
eral parity law that “[m]edical management standards limiting or excluding 
benefits based on medical necessity or medical appropriateness” are among 
the specified NQTLs in the Equity Act Regulations.197 As a result, such 
standards must be comparable to and not more stringently applied than the 
standards used for medical/surgical benefits.198 
B. Prior Authorization 
Although prior authorization is specifically listed as an NQTL, many 
private insurers and forty-four state Medicaid plans require complex author-
izations before a patient can qualify for MAT benefits, and they require 
“reauthorization processes that become more demanding with each reauthor-
ization period.”199 Such authorization processes require extensive details.200 
Documents that must be submitted as proof of prior authorization for MAT 
for opioid dependence “may take days or weeks while . . . patients risk re-
lapse, overdose, and death.”201 Additionally, many private and public insur-
ers, including Medicaid, offer minimal coverage of counseling and yet re-
quire counseling as a prerequisite to preauthorization or reauthorization of 
MAT coverage, creating a catch-22.202 Often, these plans do not require sim-
ilar processes for medical/surgical care.203 
 
Mental Health Parity Act) Brazil v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 2014 WL 1309935 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
28, 2014). 
 195. Arce, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565. 
 196. Id.; Megan Lagreca, Note, Treating a Chronic Case of Discrimination: The Ninth 
Circuit’s Prescription for Mental Health Patients’ Rights in Harlick v. Blue Shield, 58 VILL. 
L. REV. 269, 283 (2013). 
 197. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A) (2013). 
 198. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i). 
 199. Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 186, at 10–11, 33. Only Missouri, 
New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont did not explicitly require prior authorization. Id. at 
33 map 6. In addition, no information was available from Connecticut, New Jersey, or Penn-
sylvania. Id. 
 200. See id. at 41–42. 
 201. Id. at 11. 
 202. See Id. at 5, 10, 30−31. 
 203. Id. at 13. 
582 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
Amy Thompkins, an individual suffering from a dissociative disorder 
and bulimia, was denied coverage by her health insurance company.204 The 
insurance company also imposed harsh prior authorization requirements.205 
Thompkins originally brought suit under the Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, however, in Thompkins v. BC Life and Health 
Insurance Co. the court found that California’s parity laws applied.206 The 
defendant covered the plaintiff’s inpatient treatment from May to August in 
2004.207 However, in September, the defendant refused to cover any further 
inpatient treatment, and, as a result, the plaintiff left the treatment center.208 
Shortly thereafter, she relapsed, was purging several times a day, and had 
stopped eating and drinking.209 Despite these facts, the defendant instructed 
the plaintiff to obtain prior authorization, and when authorization was 
sought, the defendant only granted a “Partial Hospital Program with concur-
rent review,” based on a determination that additional treatment was not 
medically necessary.210 The plaintiff brought suit to ensure continued enti-
tlement to inpatient treatment.211 California’s parity laws “requires health 
insurance policies to cover treatment for mental illness on the same terms 
and conditions applied to other medical conditions,” and therefore, the court 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to such benefits because the defendant 
could not prove that the treatment was not medically necessary, and fur-
thermore, such restrictions were not imposed on medical services.212 
Thompkins was decided in 2006, before the Equity Act Final Regula-
tions were promulgated. If Amy Thompkins brought her case today in fed-
eral court, she would have an even stronger argument because prior authori-
zation is an NQTL explicitly mentioned in the Final Regulations of the Eq-
uity Act.213 Therefore, if such requirements are not imposed or are less strin-
gently imposed on comparable medical/surgical benefits, then the plan vio-
lates the Equity Act. Furthermore, if such plan is a mandatory and equiva-
 
 204. Thompkins v. BC Life & Health Ins. Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 953, 954–55 (C.D. Cal. 
2006). 
 205. See id. at 956–57. 
 206. Id. at 954. 
 207. Id. at 955. 
 208. See id. at 955–57. 
 209. Id. at 957. 
 210. Thompkins, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 957. 
 211. Id. at 955. 
 212. Id. at 959–60 (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 10144.5(a)–(d) (West 2013)). 
 213. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A), (iii) (2013). One of the Regulations’ examples 
states that if a plan refuses to pay benefits until prior authorization is achieved for SUD ser-
vices and yet offers only a twenty-five percent reduction in the benefits that plan would oth-
erwise pay for medical/surgical treatment before obtaining prior authorization, for instance, 
the plan is in violation of the Equity Act Interim Regulations. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(iii) (Ex-
ample 3). 
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lent coverage plan under the ACA, the plaintiff could argue that the plan 
violates the ACA as well. 
C. Residential Treatment 
Residential care is often required for SUD detoxification and mainte-
nance programs. Prior to the enactment of the Final Regulations of the Equi-
ty Act, many insurers found ways to discriminate against those with SUDs 
and MH illnesses by denying residential care—claiming that such care is not 
considered inpatient or outpatient treatment.214 However, courts still found 
that such treatment was medically necessary. For instance, in Harlick v. 
Blue Shield of Cal.,215 the plaintiff, Jeanene Harlick, suffered from anorexia 
nervosa, sought treatment in residential care, and was denied coverage after 
her insurer claimed that it simply did not cover such services.216 The court 
held that California’s Mental Health Parity Act required health plans to 
“provide coverage of all ‘medically necessary treatment’ for ‘severe mental 
illnesses’ under the same financial terms as those applied to physical illness-
es,” including residential treatment.217 
The Equity Act’s Final Regulations solidified such coverage. Although 
the Final Regulations left it to insurers to define the scope of the terms for 
inpatient and outpatient treatment, the Final Regulations do specify that in-
termediate treatment, including residential care, must be offered if compara-
ble intermediate treatment is offered for medical/surgical benefits.218 The 
Regulations also prohibit “[m]edical management standards” that unfairly 
limit or exclude benefits based on medical necessity, 219 which is often the 
 
 214. Ellen Weber, Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 179, 224 (2013). 
 215. 686 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 216. Id. at 703–05. 
 217. Id. at 719, 721. But see Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. C 09–2037 PJH, 2011 
WL 830623, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (concluding that, “in California, whether a spe-
cific plan offers residential treatment as a covered benefit is a matter of contract only,” and 
therefore, such coverage is not mandated by the state parity law); Douglas S. v. Altius Health 
Plans, Inc., No. 09-4130, slip op. at 11–13 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (finding that an “exclu-
sion” of residential treatment is not the same thing as a “limitation,” that parity is limited to 
the specified categories in the statute, and that the defendant was in compliance with the Utah 
parity law since it was not required to provide “across-the-board parity between treatment 
options for mental and physical health conditions”); Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc., No. 
1:09-cv-700 (GLS\DRH), slip op. at 5–6, 18–19 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (stating that alt-
hough the plan stated it would comply with the Equity Act, such language does not create an 
exception that “voids the Plan’s preclusion of coverage for ‘care in a residential treatment 
facility.’”). 
 218. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2013); Id. § 146.136 (c)(4)(iii) (Example 9). 
 219. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i)–(ii)(A). 
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reason insurers give for denying care, although not all medical necessity 
denials are wrongful. Wrongful denials of coverage violate the Equity Act 
when limitations are not similarly applied or are applied less stringently in 
the case of comparable medical/surgical services. When this happens and 
the plan is a mandatory and equivalent coverage plan under the ACA, the 
ACA is violated as well. 
D. Fail First and Step Therapy 
Insurers often impose practitioner limitations regarding who can pre-
scribe or provide counseling, as well as “‘fail first’ (or ‘step therapy’) crite-
ria that require documentation that other, possibly less costly therapies have 
been attempted [first] but were ineffective.”220 All the while, the patient with 
the SUD waits for effective treatment.221 
In 2013, New York State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. UnitedHealth 
Group—a class action lawsuit, which was ultimately dismissed, was pend-
ing before the Southern District of New York for violations of the ACA, 
Equity Act, and ERISA—one of the plaintiffs suffered from severe mental 
illnesses and had an SUD.222 Yet the defendant insurer dissuaded him from 
seeking residential treatment, stating “that his health plan [did] not cover 
long-term care and that [he] would need to first attempt and fail outpatient 
treatment as a prerequisite to precertification for higher, inpatient levels of 
care.”223 
Limitations such as fail-first and step therapy protocols are explicitly 
listed as NQTLs in the Equity Act Final Regulations.224 However, no lan-
guage in the defendant’s policy for medical/surgical services required fail 
first or step therapy protocols as prerequisites to inpatient services, 225 mak-
ing the prerequisite for MH/SUD benefits a violation of the Equity Act Final 
Regulations. Had the Southern District of New York reached the merits, it 
should have ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, and other injured parties should 
make similar arguments if an insurer imposes such limitations on MH/SUD 
benefits but does not do so for comparable medical/surgical benefits. 
 
 220. See Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 186, at 10–11. 
 221. See id. at 11. 
 222. Class Action Complaint at 11, 92–93, 95, N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. Unit-
edHealth Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 1599 CM). 
 223. Id. at 11. 
 224. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(F). 
 225. Class Action Complaint, supra note 222, at 28. 
2014] ACHIEVING REAL PARITY 585 
E. Reimbursement Rate Cuts 
According to ASAM’s findings, insurers impose reimbursement limita-
tions on SUD treatment, especially on psychological treatment, even though 
such services are required for MAT.226 In 2011, an insurer used this tech-
nique when it announced that it planned to terminate all of its contracts with 
MH care providers.227 In order to remain in the network, providers had to 
apply to join the network of the insurer’s subsidiary.228 However, the subsid-
iary cut compensation rates for the most common MH services by 33% to 
54%.229 There was no evidence that the rate cuts were applied to medical and 
surgical care providers who remained in the insurer’s network.230 As a result 
of such policies, in the first seven months after the rate cuts went into effect, 
69% of psychologists reported that the policy had disrupted treatment deliv-
ery, including 64% who said some patients had dropped out of treatment, 
and 61% who reported that patients had to pay additional out-of-pocket ex-
penses to continue receiving care.231 
Such limitations violate the Equity Act Regulations because they are 
NQTLs. According to the Final Regulations, “[s]tandards for provider ad-
mission to participate in a network, including reimbursement rates” is spe-
cifically listed as an NQTL, and therefore, the Comparable Test must be 
applied.232 Although many argued that it was unclear under the Interim Reg-
ulations whether discrepancies in reimbursement rates were NQTLs, the 
Final Regulations definitively confirmed that they are.233 The Final Regula-
tions state that “[p]lans and issuers may consider a wide array of factors in 
determining provider reimbursement rates for both medical/surgical services 
and [MH/SUD] services, such as service type; geographic market; demand 
for services; supply of providers; provider practice size; Medicare reim-
 
 226. See Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 187, at 10–11. 
 227. See Letter from Katherine Nordal, Exec. Dir. for Prof’l Practice, Am. Psychological 
Ass’n Practice Org. & Connie Galietti, Exec. Dir., Fla. Psychological Ass’n, to Hilda Solis, 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
& Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.apapracticecentral.org/reimbursement/rates-letter.pdf. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Letter from Katherine Nordal, Exec. Dir. for Prof’l Practice, Am. Psychological 
Ass’n Practice Org., to U.S. Dep’t of Labor,, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://www.apapracticecentral.
org/update/2014/01-16/mental-health-parity.pdf. 
 232. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i), (ii)(D) (2013). 
 233. See Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68245 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
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bursement rates; and training, experience and licensure of providers.”234 
However, the NQTL provisions in the Final Regulations require that these 
and other factors must “be applied comparably to and no more stringently 
than those applied with respect to medical/surgical services.”235 Here, the 
decreased “reimbursement rates set a standard for network participation that 
[was] extremely low,” and yet there was no evidence that the same low re-
imbursement rates were applied to medical and surgical network reim-
bursements.236 
F. Limitations on Testing for Substance Use 
Testing for substance use is a major area in which insurers have found 
ways to discriminate against those in need of SUD treatment. Tests for sub-
stance use are used in all stages of SUD treatment, including diagnosis, ac-
tive treatment, and recovery.237 The two types of SUD tests that are typically 
employed are preliminary and definitive tests.238 Whereas preliminary tests 
 
 234. Id. at 68246. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Letter from Katherine Nordal & Connie Galietti to Hilda Solis, Kathleen Sebelius & 
Timothy Geithner, supra note 227, at 3. 
 237. Public Policy Statement on Drug Testing as a Component of Addiction Treatment 
and Monitoring Programs and in Other Clinical Settings, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED. 1–2 
(Oct. 2010), http://www.asam.org/docs /publicy-policy-statements/1drug-testing---clinical-
10-10.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
 238. CATHERINE A. HAMMETT-STABLER & LYNN R. WEBSTER, A CLINICAL GUIDE TO 
URINE DRUG TESTING: AUGMENTING PAIN MANAGEMENT & ENHANCING PATIENT CARE 7 
(2008), available at http://paindr.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/A-Clinical-Guide-to-
URINE-DRUG-TESTING.pdf; Policy Statement on Testing for Substance Use, CENTER FOR 
LAWFUL ACCESS & ABUSE DETERRENCE (Mar. 5, 2014), http://claad.org/wp-content
/uploads/2014/03/CLAAD-Policy-Statement-on-Substance-Use-Testing-140305-4.pdf; 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PUBLICATION 
SERIES (TAP) 32: CLINICAL DRUG TESTING IN PRIMARY CARE 9 (2012), available at 
http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA12-4668/SMA12-4668.pdf [hereinafter TAP 32]. 
Preliminary tests are used to indicate the presence or absence of a class of substance or its 
metabolite. TAP 32, supra, at 9. In other words, they state whether the sample is positive or 
negative for the tested class of substance. Definitive tests measure the quantity of the sub-
stance or its metabolite present in the specimen. Id. Preliminary tests are sometimes referred 
to as “qualitative tests,” and definitive tests are sometimes referred to as “quantitative tests.” 
Id. The terms “qualitative” and “quantitative” are not intuitive and are easily confused. 
Therefore, they are not practical in daily use. Preliminary tests are also sometimes referred to 
as screening tests, HAMMETT-STABLER & WEBSTER, supra, at 7; TAP 32, supra, at 9, howev-
er, such terminology is imprecise and confusing because routine clinical screening for SUDs 
is a preventative service to deter substance use and a diagnostic tool to indicate whether the 
patient is likely using substances. Definitive tests are often used for clinical screening pur-
poses, and preliminary tests are sometimes used during the active treatment and recovery 
phases of treatment. Definitive tests are sometimes called “confirmatory tests,” HAMMETT-
STABLER & WEBSTER, supra, at 7–8; TAP 32, supra, at 10, but such terminology is imprecise 
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determine whether a sample is positive or negative for a tested class of sub-
stances, definitive tests can measure the quantity of a substance or its me-
tabolite that is present in a specimen and can more reliably detect the pres-
ence of a substance in low concentrations.239 A definitive test can also iden-
tify specific substances within a substance class.240 This distinction is im-
portant, particularly for physicians who must monitor their patients for com-
pliance with the prescribed SUD treatment regimen. Preliminary tests are 
more prone to false positives, false negatives, inaccuracies due to the lack of 
ability to determine how much of a substance is present, and more subjec-
tive interpretation of results.241 In contrast, such issues are highly unlikely in 
a definitive test as long as the test is performed correctly.242 
Yet many insurers will only cover diagnostic and therapeutic testing for 
SUD treatment when it is conducted using certain methods, under specific 
circumstances, with limited frequency, and for a predefined duration, possi-
bly interfering with a physician’s judgment.243 For instance, most state Med-
icaid plans and private insurance policies only find it medically necessary to 
provide limited coverage, and only for preliminary tests in certain circum-
stances—such as when the patient is in an unexplained coma, has severe or 
unexplained cardiovascular instability, or has seizures with an undetermined 
history.244 Insurers and Medicaid plans typically find it medically necessary 
 
if interpreted to mean that they necessarily confirm or refute the results of a preliminary test. 
Definitive tests are often conducted exclusive of preliminary tests in all stages of care: diag-
nosis, active treatment, and recovery support. Preliminary tests may also be confirmatory in 
some cases. 
 239. Policy Statement on Testing for Substance Use, supra note 236;TAP 32, supra note 
237, at 9. 
 240. TAP 32, supra note 238, at 9–10. 
 241. Barry Meier, Increase in Urine Testing Raises Ethical Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/business/increase-in-urine-testing-raises-eth
ical-questions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; TAP 32, supra note 237, at 27. 
 242. See TAP 32, supra note 237, at 9–10, 24–25. 
 243. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE DRUG COURT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE/ 
CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND RELATED SERVICES FOR DRUG COURT CLIENTS 2 (2012), available at 
http://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/11204/1132/4143.pdf?sequence=1; Public Policy State-
ment on Drug Testing as a Component of Addiction Treatment and Monitoring Programs and 
in Other Clinical Settings, supra note 236, at 3. See, e.g., HEALTH PLAN, URINE DRUG 
TESTING: COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT GUIDELINES 1–4 (2012), available at http://
healthplan.org/pdf/UrineDrugTesting.pdf; NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PLAN, PROVIDER 
PAYMENT GUIDELINES: URINE DRUG TESTING 1 (2013), available at http://nhp.org/PDFs/
Providers/UrineDrugTestingGuidelines_12-1-2012.pdf. 
 244. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., COMMENTS: QUALITATIVE DRUG 
TESTING 7 (2013), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/lcd_
attachments/32450_1/l32450 _path035060112.pdf; HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF 
N.J., UNIFORM MEDICAL POLICY MANUAL: DRUG SCREENING/TESTING IN THE CONTEXT OF 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT (2014), available at https://services5 .horizon-bcbsnj.com/
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to cover definitive tests only in special circumstances, such as to resolve 
inconsistent preliminary tests or to confirm positive test results, if at all.245 
Given their inaccuracy and unreliability, preliminary tests should rarely, if 
ever, be used in therapeutic settings, where errors can result in drug interac-
tions, overdoses, and deaths.246 
Such practices of denying or limiting coverage for substance-use test-
ing constitute NQTLs in violation of the Equity Act Final Regulations. 
“Medical management standards limiting or excluding benefits based on 
medical necessity” is one of the specific examples of an NQTL.247 When an 
insurer applies such a limitation more stringently to SUD testing for 
MH/SUD care than to comparable laboratory testing for medical/surgical 
conditions, like tests used to determine cholesterol levels or diabetes, the 
insurer’s policies violate the Equity Act. Insurers should avoid placing such 
stringent limitations on SUD testing. 
G. Quantitative Limits 
Insurers have also imposed quantitative limits on MH/SUD treatment, 
such as lifetime, annual, and age limits.248 Medicaid and insurance plans 
place lifetime limits on the prescription of methadone and buprenorphine,249 
unlike other medications,  despite evidence that shows that discontinuing 
treatment typically results in relapse and elevates risk of mortality.250 For 
instance, at least eleven state Medicaid plans include a definitive limit, rang-
ing from twelve to thirty-six months, on how long a patient can receive bu-
prenorphine benefits during his or her lifetime.251 Furthermore, most states 
that do not include strict limits on buprenorphine do impose additional re-
 
eprise/main/horizon/content/homepage/MedPol/MedPol_2014.5.30_13.15.11; MAGELLAN 
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC., MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA GUIDELINES 73 (2014), available 
at https://www .magellanprovider.com/MHS/MGL/providing_care/clinical_guidelines/MNC.
pdf. 
 245. See, e.g., HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF N.J., supra note 243; HEALTH PLAN, 
supra note 242, at 3. 
 246. Policy Statement on Testing for Substance Use, supra note 238. 
 247. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A) (2013). 
 248. See Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 187, at 10, 38–39. 
 249. Buprenorphine is an opioid medication that the FDA has approved as safe and effec-
tive for the treatment of opioid detoxification and maintenance treatment. Ellen M. Weber, 
Failure of Physicians to Prescribe Pharmacotherapies for Addiction: Regulatory Restrictions 
and Physician Resistance, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 49, 49 n.2 (2010); American So-
ciety of Addiction Med., Opioid Addiction Disease: Stabilizing Medication Access, 
http://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/asam---opioid-addiction-disease-meds-
access-2014.pdf?sfvrsn=0, (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 250. Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 187, at 10, 3. 
 251. Id. at 34. The eleven states are Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. 
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newal application requirements after a similar amount of time has passed.252 
Many states also include limitations on refills and on the dosage that pa-
tients can receive after six months on the medication, regardless of what a 
physician determines is the appropriate amount.253 
Such limitations are quantitative treatment limitations in violation of 
the Equity Act Regulations because they are expressed numerically.254 Une-
qual limitations placed on “frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of 
coverage, days in a waiting period, or other similar limits on the scope . . . of 
treatment” are prohibited under the Equity Act if such limitations are “more 
restrictive than the predominant [limitations] applied to substantially all 
medical/surgical benefits in the same classification,” such as maintenance 
medications for chronic conditions.255 As such, parties should bring claims 
under the Equity Act or state parity laws. 
In Z.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Grp. Health Coop., the plaintiffs filed suit on be-
half of their twelve-year-old daughter who had developmental learning disa-
bilities.256 When the defendant denied coverage of speech therapy treatment, 
claiming it only covered such therapy for children aged six years old or 
younger, the plaintiff sued pursuant to ERISA and Washington State’s Men-
tal Health Parity Act, which allows voluntary participation.257 The defendant 
argued that it corrected the problem by applying the age limit to all of its 
therapy services because it applied the age seven cutoff to speech therapy, 
physical therapy, and occupational therapy, and such therapies treat medical 
and MH conditions alike.258 However, the court found that, “[i]n actuality, 
[the defendant did] not apply an age-based treatment limitation across the 
board to all therapies related to medical and surgical services.”259 Instead, it 
applied aged-based limitations solely to a narrow subcategory of medi-
cal/surgical services—non-rehabilitative therapy services.260 This case is 
important because, although the insurer “corrected” the inequity by placing 
the same restriction on some medical/surgical benefits that it had applied to 
MH/SUD benefits, supposedly bringing the plan into compliance, the court 
still held that the limitation violated the law.261 The court noted that the pari-
 
 252. See Id. at 61–65. 
 253. Id. at 39. 
 254. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a) (2013). 
 255. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a), (c)(2)(i). 
 256. Z.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Grp. Health Coop., No. C11-1119RSL, 2012 WL 1997705, at *1 
(W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012). 
 257. Id. at *1–2. 
 258. Id. at *10. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. (“Non-rehabilitative therap[y]” was defined as “‘therapy for degenerative or 
static conditions when the expected outcome is primarily to maintain the Member’s level of 
functioning,’ as opposed to ‘restore function following illness, injury or surgery.’”). 
 261. Id. at *12. 
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ty act was intended to “bolster” coverage and not “weaken or supplant . . . 
baseline coverage.”262 The court therefore found that the plan violated the 
spirit of the law even if it did not violate the letter of the law.263 
H. How the ACA Factors in 
In light of the implementation of the ACA, protection under the Equity 
Act will be even more far-reaching. The ACA has expanded parity to non-
grandfathered small group plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, and 
Medicaid ABP plans,264 which means Equity Act violation claims are no 
longer limited to large group plans. Therefore, a significantly greater num-
ber of harmed individuals can and should seek enforcement of parity laws 
pursuant to the Equity Act, the ACA, and state parity laws. 
III. DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES MUST BE CHALLENGED AND CHANGED 
The Equity Act, Equity Act Regulations, ACA, and state parity laws 
theoretically allow for better access to SUD treatment. However, until such 
laws and regulations are properly enforced, patients will continue to struggle 
to obtain care while the prescription drug abuse epidemic continues to dev-
astate families and communities. This section discusses strategies for clos-
ing loopholes and for properly enforcing parity laws in light of federal and 
state laws and regulations. It discusses which agencies have enforcement 
authority; methods of federal enforcement, such as internal appeals, law-
suits, and excise taxes; methods of enforcement under Medicaid plans; joint 
state and federal enforcement; state regulations and avoiding preemption; 
enactment of stricter state parity laws; and equal cost cutting measures. 
A. Enforcement of the ACA and Equity Act 
The PHSA sets forth the authority to enforce and impose penalties for 
noncompliance with both the Equity Act and the ACA.265 Pursuant to sec-
tion 2723(a) of the PHSA, “states have primary enforcement authority over 
 
 262. Z.D. ex rel. J.D., 2012 WL 1997705, at *12. 
 263. See id. (finding that the defendant’s application of the statute ignored its “history and 
structure” and created “limitations that would defeat the very purpose of the statute”). 
 264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u-7(b)(5)–(6), 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136 
(2013); 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(3) (2013); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; 
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 12,834, 12,866 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156). 
 265. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18041(a)(1) (2012); Final Rules Under 
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 
2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,252 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 
C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
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health insurance issuers.”266 A health insurance issuer is defined as “an in-
surance company, insurance service, or insurance organization . . . licensed 
to engage in the business of insurance in a State and which is subject to 
State law.”267 State insurance departments have primary authority over issu-
ers in individual and group markets, and CMS, as a branch of HHS, has sec-
ondary enforcement authority.268 This means that CMS “has enforcement 
authority . . . if the State notifies CMS that it has not enacted legislation to 
enforce or is otherwise not enforcing [the ACA or Equity Act], or if CMS 
determines that the State is not substantially enforcing [the ACA or Equity 
Act].”269 
“DOL and the IRS generally have enforcement authority over private 
sector employment-based [health] plans that are subject to ERISA,”270 
whereas “HHS has direct enforcement authority [over] . . . non-Federal gov-
ernmental plans,” i.e. plans sponsored by state and local government em-
ployers.271 The three agencies “generally collaborate with one another, as 
appropriate, on any investigations and broad-based compliance assistance 
efforts” when complaints of Equity Act and ACA violations are submit-
ted.272 
The IRS, DOL, and HHS must provide a detailed framework for de-
termining and enforcing parity compliance as well as provide instructions on 
how to properly bring a complaint as discussed in this section. 
 
 266. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,252; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a); 42 U.S.C. § 
18041(a)–(c) (quoting the Fed. Reg.). 
 267. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(b)(2) (2012). 
 268. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(1)–(2); Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete 
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,252; 
Weber, supra note 214. 
 269. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,252; 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b)–(c) (quoting the 
Fed. Reg.). 
 270. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COMPLIANCE OF GROUP HEALTH PLANS 
(AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OFFERED IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH PLANS) WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008, at 22 
(2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/mhpaeareporttocongress2012.
html. ERISA employee benefit plans include all private sector employee benefit plans except 
for church plans; plans in which the sole purpose is to comply with workers’ compensation, 
unemployment, or disability insurance laws; plans maintained outside of the U.S. primarily 
for the benefit of non-resident aliens; or excess benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)–(b) (2012). 
Additionally, ERISA does not cover governmental plans. Id. 
 271. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 252; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(b)(1)(B). (Quote from 
DOL) 
 272. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 252; JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41624, ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS UNDER THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.ppsv.com/assets/attachments/crsreport.pdf. 
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1. Enforcement Through Internal Appeals Process 
The ACA sets forth specific rules governing adverse benefit determina-
tions and their appeals.273 For instance, “[t]he plan or issuer must ensure that 
all claims and appeals are adjudicated in a manner designed to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of the persons involved in making the deci-
sion.”274 The plan or issuer may not reduce or terminate “an ongoing course 
of treatment without providing advance notice and an opportunity for ad-
vance review.”275 As such, if coverage has been denied, the insured should 
request a copy of the denial letter explaining the reason for any denial of 
reimbursement or payment and disclosure of the criteria for medical necessi-
ty determinations regarding MH/SUD benefits.276 He should then file an 
internal appeal in which his insurance company conducts its own “full and 
fair review of its decision.”277 It is important to note that the ACA and its 
interim final regulations “require a plan and issuer to provide continued 
coverage pending the outcome of an internal appeal.”278 
If the internal appeal is unsuccessful, the insured may then request an 
external review in which an independent third party reviews the decision.279 
If the external reviewer overturns the insurer’s denial, the insurer must give 
the insured the payments or services requested in the insured’s claim.280 
 
 273. Class Action Complaint at 111, N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. UnitedHealth 
Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 CV 1599 CM). 
 274. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,333 (July 23, 2010) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pts. 54 & 602; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 275. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,334. 
 276. Under the Equity Act Final Rules, all covered plan participants are entitled to an 
explanation of the denial as well as an explanation of the plan’s medical necessity determina-
tions. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,247 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
 277. See How to Appeal a Health Plan Decision, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.
healthcare.gov/how-do-i-appeal-a-health-insurance-companys-decision/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2014). All plans must implement an effective internal appeals process of coverage determina-
tions and claims and comply with any applicable state external review process. 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg-19(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012). 
 278. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,334; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(C). (Quote from 
FR) 
 279. How to Appeal a Health Plan Decision, supra note 260. 
 280. Appealing Health Plan Decisions, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/appeal/appealing-health-plan-decisions.html (last visit-
ed Mar. 31, 2014). 
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2. Enforcement Through Federal Lawsuits 
If an appeal is unsuccessful, the next step may be to bring a suit. At the 
federal level, individuals with employee benefit plans should bring suits 
under ERISA to challenge a denial of benefits that violates the ACA or Eq-
uity Act.281 “Almost all health benefits plans offered through private em-
ployers are governed by ERISA,” and ERISA preempts state law.282 Under § 
502(a) of ERISA, plan participants and beneficiaries can challenge Equity 
Act violations by bringing a case “to recover benefits due to [them] under 
the terms of [their] plan[s], to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the 
plan[s], or to clarify [their] rights to future benefits under the terms of the 
plan[s].”283 
In bringing a claim to challenge a denial of benefits, an individual may 
“challenge the underlying standard that was the basis for the denial of cov-
erage or reimbursement as being non-compliant with the [Equity] Act.”284 
The plaintiff should make his case using a two-part test: first, allege that the 
“erroneous application of the plan’s medical necessity criteria or other 
standard resulted in the denial of care or reimbursement”; and second, allege 
“that the application of non-comparable medical necessity criteria or other 
medical management standards violated the [Equity] Act.”285 
Alternatively, by bringing a claim to enforce employee benefit rights, 
the individual can “challenge a wide range of non-compliant plan design 
features . . . that can be addressed prospectively, without awaiting . . . deni-
al” of a health service.286 The individual can challenge a plan for “any act or 
practice” that violates ERISA provisions, including the Equity Act.287 Such 
 
 281. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012); see Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. C 09–2037 
PJH, 2011 WL 830623, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (an example of a plaintiff bringing a 
claim under ERISA § 502 for federal parity violations). The Equity Act and the ACA do not 
include a private right of action for individuals to bring suit. Therefore, harmed parties with 
employer-sponsored plans would have to challenge Equity Act and ACA violations by bring-
ing suit under § 502(a) of ERISA since both the Equity Act and the ACA are amendments to 
ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Weber, supra note 248, at 224–25. 
 282. Chapter VIII.: Your Rights to Appeal and Litigate Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 
CAL. PATIENT’S GUIDE, http://www.calpatientguide.org/viii.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 283. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Weber, supra note 249, at 225–26. 
 284. Weber, supra note 249, at 225. 
 285. Id. at 226. 
 286. Id. at 225–26. 
 287. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Although an individual can bring a case under ERISA for an 
Equity Act violation, C.M. v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. is the only case thus far in 
which a court has considered the Equity Act Regulations. No. 5:12-cv-00108, 2013 WL 
4453754 (D. Vt. Apr. 30, 2013). However, Fletcher is now irrelevant because the holding 
pertained to a part of the Interim Regulations that was excluded from the Final Regulations. 
Under the Comparable Test in the Interim Regulations, limitations on MH/SUD must be no 
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violations may include more restrictive financial requirements, quantitative 
treatment limitations, and NQTLs, among other things.288 “ERISA limits the 
remedies for violations of [the Equity Act] to equitable relief: the provision 
of the benefit allowed under the plan or reimbursement for cost of the 
care.”289 
Summary judgment is an important mechanism for Equity Act cases 
brought under ERISA. The court in Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal. summa-
rized the process as follows: 
Ordinarily, summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. However, “where the abuse of discretion standard applies 
in an ERISA benefits denial case, a motion for summary judgment is 
merely the conduit to bring the legal question before the district court 
and the usual tests of summary judgment, such as whether a genuine dis-
pute of material fact exists, do not apply.”290 
To date, no federal parity case appears to have made it past summary 
judgment, likely because when cases are dismissed on summary judgment, 
the matters end, and when the cases survive summary judgment, the parties 
typically settle.291 
3. Excise Tax 
Pursuant to the IRC, those who violate the Equity Act or the ACA may 
also face a federal excise tax.292 Employers are generally responsible for 
paying the tax for single-employer plans, and the tax is imposed on the plan 
for multiemployer plans.293 An employer must pay a tax of $100 per day for 
each individual who was harmed by the employer’s Equity Act or ACA vio-
 
more stringent than those placed on comparable medical/surgical benefits, “except to the 
extent that recognized clinically appropriate standards of care may permit a difference.” Id. 
at *3 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i) (2013)). The court held that the defendant had 
an affirmative duty to prove that a recognized clinically appropriate standard of care was 
applicable. Id. at *7. However, the Final Regulations omitted the “clinically appropriate 
standards of care” language due to its potential for abuse. 
 288. Weber, supra note 248, at 229. 
 289. Weber, supra note 248, at 226; see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (3). 
 290. Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. C 09–2037 PJH, 2011 WL 830623, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Nolan v. Heald College, 551 F.3d 1148, 1154 
(9th Cir. 2009)). 
 291. The authors of this article did an extensive and exhaustive search of federal case law 
and found no MHPA or Equity Act cases that have passed the summary judgment stage. See 
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
183 (2008). 
 292. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D, 4980I (2012). 
 293. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I(c)(1)–(2). 
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lation, and the tax liability continues for the duration of the noncompliance 
period.294 Where violations are considered to be more than de minimis, the 
amount will not be less than $15,000.295 However, the amount of tax is sub-
ject to limitations, and there are several instances in which it does not apply, 
such as if the employer did not know and would not have known after exer-
cising reasonable diligence that it failed to comply with the Equity Act or 
the ACA; “if the violation is due to reasonable cause and not willful negli-
gence”; and if “the employer corrected the violation within thirty days of the 
date it knew or should have known of its failure to comply.”296 
A harmed individual cannot file a complaint to seek imposition of the 
excise tax. Instead, employers are required to self-report such violations.297 
Moreover, whereas employers were initially required to report annually, the 
Equity Act Final Regulations changed this requirement, stating “that the 
parity analysis would not need to be performed annually absent changes in 
plan design or indications that assumptions or data were inaccurate.”298 
Failure to file the excise tax return and pay the excise tax on or before 
the required due date will result in further penalties and related interest un-
less the failure to timely file or pay is “due to reasonable cause and not to 
willful neglect.”299 However, if a noncompliant employer fails to self-report, 
an aggrieved individual can report the employer’s noncompliance by filing a 
complaint under the IRS whistleblower procedures.300 If the employee’s 
complaint leads to the successful collection of unpaid taxes from a noncom-
pliant employer, the whistleblower may be entitled to 15 to 30 percent of the 
proceeds.301 
 
 294. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)–(b)(1), (e)(1), 4980I(c)(1)–(2); Weber, supra note 249, at 
230. 
 295. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(3)(B). 
 296. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(c); Weber, supra note 248, at 230. 
 297. Employer Comparable Contributions to Health Savings Accounts Under Section 
4980G, and Requirement of Return for Filing of the Excise Tax Under Section 4980B, 
4980D, 4980E or 4980G, 74 Fed. Reg. 45,994, 46,000 (Sept. 8, 2009) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 54). 
 298. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,243 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
 299. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I(e). 
 300. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2011). For a description of the whistleblower process, see 
How Do You File a Whistleblower Award Claim Under Section 7623(a) or (b), IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/uac/How-Do-You-File-a-Whistleblower-Award-Claim-Under-Section-7623-
(a)-or-(b) (last updated Apr. 30, 2014). 
 301. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1). The claimant can fill out IRS Form 211 to initiate an 
investigation. See Form 211: Application for Award for Original Information, IRS (Mar. 
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f211.pdf. 
596 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
4. Enforcing the Equity Act and the ACA in Medicaid Plans 
Medicaid plays a large role in funding mental health and substance use 
care, paying nearly 60% of mental health care costs across the country,302 
compared to less than 30% of total health care costs.303 And yet, as estab-
lished in the previous part of this Article, Medicaid plans are continuously 
out of compliance with the Equity Act.304 
Also troubling, the Final Regulations state that they do not apply to 
MCOs or Medicaid ABPs and that such plans are governed by guidance 
issued by CMS instead.305 This statement created a misconception that the 
Equity Act regulations, in general, do not apply to Medicaid plans. Howev-
er, that is not the case. The CMS guidance “adopted the basic framework of 
the [Equity Act].”306 Furthermore, it stated that ABPs must comply with the 
Equity Act provisions regarding financial requirements and both quantita-
tive and non-quantitative treatment limitations.307 Although it found that 
MCOs are governed by their contracts with states rather than the Final 
Rules, such plans must comply with their contracts and with a list of specific 
parity standards, which include the following: 
 Medical management techniques used by the MCO, such as pre-
authorization requirements, which are applied to [MH/SUD] 
benefits must be comparable to and applied no more stringently 
than the medical management techniques that are applied to 
medical/surgical benefits. 
 Any benefits offered by an MCO beyond those specified in the 
Medicaid state plan also must be compliant with [the Equity 
Act]. 
 
 302. Paige Winfield Cunningham, Politico: ACA MH Parity Guarantees Limited . . . 
When Therapists Don’t Accept Insurance, N.Y. ASS’N PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION 
SERVICES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.nyaprs.org/e-news-bulletins/2013/005284.cfm. 
 303. See Klees, Wolfe, & Curtis, supra note 37, at 4, 25. 
 304. See supra Part II. 
 305. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,252 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SHO # 13-001, STATE 
HEALTH OFFICIAL LETTER RE: APPLICATION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION 
EQUITY ACT TO MEDICAID MCOS, CHIP, AND ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT (BENCHMARK) PLANS 2 
(Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.medicaid.gov /Federal-Policy-Guidance/downloads/
SHO-13-001.pdf. 
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 In accordance with [the Equity Act] and federal Medicaid man-
aged care regulations at 42 CFR 438 Subpart F,
308
 the criteria for 
medical necessity determinations made under the plan for 
[MH/SUD] benefits must be made available by the plan adminis-
trator to any current or potential participant, beneficiary, or con-
tracting provider upon request. The reasons for any denial of re-
imbursement or payment with respect to [MH/SUD] benefits 
must be provided to plan participants and beneficiaries upon re-
quest within a reasonable time. 
 When out-of-network coverage is available for medical/surgical 
benefits, it also must be available for [MH/SUD] benefits. States 
are responsible for assessing their contracts with all MCOs that 
offer medical and surgical benefits and [MH/SUD] benefits, to 
ensure that plans comply with the provisions of [the Equity Act] 
as set forth [in the bullet points] above.
309 
Furthermore, state Medicaid plans may choose to enforce all of the Eq-
uity Act regulations, and some state contracts incorporate the Equity Act 
and its regulations. For instance, New Jersey’s MCO contract states that 
Medicaid services shall be provided in accordance with “all applicable fed-
eral and State statutes, rules, and regulations including the [Equity Act and 
the ACA],” and Texas’s MCO contract states that “services may be subject 
to . . . non-quantitative treatment limitations, provided such limitations 
comply with the requirements of the [Equity Act].”310 
If harmed individuals participate in Medicaid plans that do not comply 
with these requirements, they should file appeals of coverage denials and 
request state hearings;311 or, for systematic denials, such as those commonly 
imposed on SUD benefits, plaintiffs can band together and file a class action 
suit.312 For instance, in Peacock ex rel. NB v. District of Columbia,313 “[f]ive 
 
 308. These regulations govern the grievance system for persons with Medicaid whose 
claims for assistance are denied or not acted upon promptly. 42 C.F.R. § 438.400 (2013). 
 309. CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 306, at 3. 
 310. Contract Between State of New Jersey Department of Human Services Division of 
Medical Assistance and Health Services and ________, Contractor, STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
art. 4.1 (Jan. 2014), http://www.state.nj.us /humanservices/dmahs/info/resources/care/hmo-
contract.pdf; Uniform Managed Care Terms & Conditions, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES 
COMMISSION 336, http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/medicaid/UniformManagedCareContract .pdf 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
 311. Parity Toolkit for Addiction & Mental Health Consumers, Providers & Advocates, 
PARITY IMPLEMENTATION COALITION 9–11, 28 (Sept. 2010), http://parityispersonal.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/Parity %20Toolkit.pdf. For a full explanation of the Medicaid Appeals 
Process, see MaryBeth Musumeci, A Guide to the Medicaid Appeals Process, HENRY J. 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/
01/8287.pdf. 
 312. See Peacock ex rel. NB v. District of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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Medicaid recipients filed [a] class action against the District of Columbia, 
alleging that the District [had] systematically denie[d] Medicaid coverage of 
prescription medications without providing the written notice required by 
federal and D.C. law.”314 The district court dismissed the case, concluding 
the “plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and de-
claratory relief” because not all of the class members established standing.315 
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that at least one member 
of the class “sufficiently establish[ed] injury, causation, and redressability,” 
and therefore there was “no need to decide whether the other plaintiffs [had] 
standing.”316 The court also noted that “[s]tates electing to participate in 
Medicaid must comply with requirements imposed by federal law.”317 This 
includes compliance with provisions of the Equity Act and ACA that apply 
to Medicaid, and therefore, class actions may be brought to challenge Medi-
caid plans for noncompliance with such federal regulations. 
Additionally, the private insurance requirements of Title XXVII of the 
PHSA apply to government plans, including Medicaid.318 Under the PHSA, 
HHS may take enforcement action and impose civil penalties against health 
insurance issuers in a state if the Secretary determines that a state has failed 
to substantially enforce an Equity Act or ACA provision with respect to a 
government plan.319 
5. Joint Federal and State Enforcement of the ACA 
Similar to the enforcement methods for Medicaid, states primarily en-
force the ACA with respect to individual and group market insurance and 
can require insurers to meet federal standards.320 If, however, a state fails to 
substantially enforce all or parts of the ACA, or if the state notifies the fed-
eral government that it does not have the authority to enforce or is not en-
forcing the law, federal regulators at CMS may intervene.321 As of January 
 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 80. 
 315. Id. at 80–81. 
 316. Id. at 86–87. 
 317. Id. at 80. 
 318. STAMAN, supra note 272, at 5, 7; STATE HEALTH OFFICIAL LETTER RE: APPLICATION 
OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT TO MEDICAID MCOS, CHIP, 
AND ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT (BENCHMARK) PLANS 3, supra note 307. 
 319. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(2), (b)(2)(A) (2012); STAMAN, supra note 272, at 7–8. 
 320. See 45 C.F.R. § 150.101(b)(2) (2013). 
 321. Id.; Ensuring Compliance with the Health Insurance Market Reforms, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/
Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/compliance.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). CMS has 
enforcement authority pursuant to sections 2723 and 2761 of the PHSA, and rulemaking 
authority pursuant to section 2792 of the PHSA, allowing it to govern group health plans that 
are non-federal governmental plans under the ACA. Id. § 150.101(a)–(b); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
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1, 2014, five states—Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyo-
ming—“have notified CMS that they do not have the authority to enforce or 
are not otherwise enforcing the [ACA].”322 
Federal regulators have the authority to impose civil money penalties 
per violation of the ACA of $100 a day for each individual that is affected 
by an insurer’s noncompliance.323 “At any time, a state that is willing and 
able may assume enforcement authority of the [ACA] standards.”324 At such 
time, “CMS will work with the state to ensure an effective transition.”325 
“These arrangements allow CMS to leverage the expertise of the states in 
monitoring their marketplaces and avoid dual regulation of insurers at the 
state and federal levels.”326 “This approach also may minimize consumers’ 
confusion and duplication of efforts by the states and CMS.”327 
It is unclear, though, how the new arrangements align with existing fed-
eral regulations that require CMS to make a formal determination that a 
state has not substantially enforced federal law before [deciding to inter-
vene]. Further clarification will be needed to address questions about: 1) 
whether CMS can bring an enforcement action  against an insurer with-
out first making a formal determination that the state is not substantially 
enforcing; and 2) whether federal law allows insurers to be subject to 
penalties at both the federal and state levels for the same violation. Be-
cause questions remain about the coordination that might be required be-
tween state and federal regulators, states should consider whether new 
legislation or regulations—either to amend existing state law or give 
their insurance department more authority—are more appropriate to ad-
dress enforcement gaps, continue meaningful regulatory oversight, and 
promote consumer protections at the state level.
328
 
 
300gg-21(a)(1), 300gg-61(b), 300gg-92 (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; 
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 12,834, 12,841 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156). 
 322. Ensuring Compliance with the Health Insurance Market Reforms, supra note 321. 
 323. 45 C.F.R. § 150.315 (2013). 
 324. Ensuring Compliance with the Health Insurance Market Reforms, supra note 321. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Katie Keith & Kevin Lucia, New Guidance: Federal Regulators Allow “Collabora-
tive Arrangements” for ACA Enforcement, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Blog/2013/Apr/Federal-Regulators-Allow-Collabora
tive-Arrangements.aspx. 
 327. Id. 
    328. Id. 
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B. State Regulations and Enforcement 
“Overall, the federal government . . . only weakly enforced parity, 
while the issuance of [the Equity Act] final rule [was] delayed for years.”329 
Enforcement of the Equity Act’s Interim Final Rule often defaulted to state 
insurance boards, commissioners of health, or analogous agencies.330 Deci-
sions could then be appealed in state courts under the state’s parity laws. 
State parity claims typically are presented in the form of breach of contract 
claims because insurance policies are treated as contracts, and most insur-
ance policies contain a clause stating that they will comply with state law.331 
However, injured parties should be careful to avoid ERISA preemption. 
This section discusses preemption and the need for stronger state parity 
laws. 
1. Preemption 
The Equity Act Final Regulations state that the Equity Act require-
ments should not “be construed to supersede any provision of State law 
which establishes, implements, or continues . . . any standard or requirement 
solely relating to health insurance issuers in connection with group health 
insurance coverage except to the extent that such standard or requirement 
prevents the application of a [federal parity] requirement.”332 The preemp-
tion provision also applies to individual health insurance coverage but does 
not mention any other type of plan.333 “[T]his is intended to be the ‘narrow-
est’ preemption of State laws,” and states may enact more stringent laws, 
such as parity mandates.334 
 
 329. Dennis Grantham, Questions About Essential Health Benefits, Medicaid Expansion, 
and Parity Enforcement?, BEHAV. HEALTHCARE (May 22, 2013), http://www.behavioral.
net/article/questions-about-essential-health-benefits-medicaid-expansion-and-parity-
enforcement. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See, e.g., Daley v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 415 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 2005); B.C. v. 
Blue Cross of Cal., No. CV 11-08961 GAF (AJWx), 2012 WL 12782, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 
2012); Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 568 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (D.N.J. 
2008); Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 332. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,252 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
 333. See id. at 68,252 n.49. 
 334. Id. at 68, 252. 
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However, plaintiffs should be careful to avoid preemption under 
ERISA when bringing a claim for a violation of their state parity act.335 
ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws” pertaining to a covered em-
ployee benefit plan.336 ERISA employee benefit plans include those that are 
established or maintained by any private employer.337 In Daley v. Marriott 
International, Inc.,338 the defendants’ plan placed annual and lifetime limits 
on the number of in-network, outpatient mental health visits.339 When they 
denied the plaintiff coverage after she exceeded the limit of visits, she sued 
for breach of contract under the state parity laws and breach of fiduciary 
duty under ERISA, “alleg[ing] that the Plan failed to provide mental-health 
coverage in accordance with Nebraska’s mental-health parity law.”340 The 
Eighth Circuit held that “ERISA broadly preempts ‘any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan.’”341 “ERISA contains an exception to the general rule of preemption, 
which is referred to as the ‘savings clause.’”342 “Under the savings clause, a 
state law that regulates insurance is ‘saved’ from ERISA preemption.”343 Yet 
“ERISA’s ‘deemer clause,’ in turn, ‘exempt[s] self-funded ERISA plans 
from state laws that “regulat[e] insurance” within the meaning of the savings 
clause.’”344 “The effect of the deemer clause is that ‘self-funded ERISA 
plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that regulation “relate[s] 
to” the plans.’”345 A self-funded plan is one in which, rather than buying 
insurance coverage, an employer puts money directly into the plan, and the 
employee uses such funds to pay for benefits in a “pay-as-you-go” man-
ner.346 The court held that because Nebraska’s mental health parity “law 
‘relates to’ an ERISA employee benefit plan, ERISA’s deemer clause ex-
empts [the defendant’s] self-funded Plan from application of [the state] 
mental-health parity law.”347 
 
 335. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738–48 (1985); Beye, 
568 F. Supp. 2d at 566–70; DeVito v. Aetna, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529–31 (D.N.J. 
2008). 
 336. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
 337. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2012). 
 338. 415 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 339. Id. at 892. 
 340. Id. at 891–92. 
 341. Id. at  894. Any “law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan . . . if it has a connection 
with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983). 
 342. Daley, 415 F.3d at 894. 
 343. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)). 
 344. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990)). 
 345. Id. at 894–95 (alteration in original) (quoting FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61). 
 346. Peter Schmidt, The Basics of ERISA as It Relates to Health Plans, EBRI ISSUE 
BRIEF, Nov. 1995, at 2, 5, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1195ib.pdf. 
 347. Daley, 415 F.3d at 895. 
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Furthermore, in DeVito v. Aetna, Inc., another case in which the plain-
tiff brought a suit for violations of state parity laws, the court reiterated the 
following: 
[I]f an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of coverage for 
medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage only be-
cause of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan, and 
where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan 
terms is violated, then the suit falls “within the scope 
of” ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). In other words, if an individual, at some point 
in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and 
where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a de-
fendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of action is completely pre-
empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
348
 
Therefore, individuals should avoid bringing state parity claims against 
self-funded companies and should file ERISA claims in such instances. For 
all other insurers, plaintiffs should continue to challenge parity violations 
under both federal regulations and state parity laws.349 
2. Enacting Stricter State Parity Laws 
The plain text of the Equity Act requires that MH and SUDs receive 
the same level of coverage that is provided for other medical care.350 This is 
also the minimum standard for state parity laws, known herein as “voluntary 
coverage.”351 Unfortunately, the Equity Act only applies to plans that choose 
to voluntarily offer SUD benefits in addition to medical and surgical bene-
fits, and the ACA only requires SUD benefits for small group plans, indi-
vidual plans, Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs.352 This means that large 
group plan coverage of SUD benefits is optional. 
To close this loophole, states should follow the lead of Vermont’s pari-
ty law, which provides for mandatory and equivalent coverage.353 Similarly, 
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in Illinois, which also has mandatory and equivalent coverage laws, the De-
partment of Insurance issued a press release stating that it is “committed to 
the principle set forth in [the Equity Act] that coverage for [MH/SUD] bene-
fits must be equivalent to coverage for other benefits,” and that “[i]n the 
event that ambiguity is argued to exist in the implementation of [the Equity 
Act] or its regulations, the Department will resolve such ambiguity in favor 
of the patients and families . . . whom the law is meant to protect.”354 Illi-
nois’s parity laws not only comply with the Equity Act and its regulations, 
but they also require parity for SUDs as a mandatory and equivalent cover-
age requirement, making them more stringent than the voluntary coverage 
federal law.355 
Looser state laws, such as those that do not provide for SUD coverage 
in addition to MH coverage, are invalid under the Equity Act, which only 
authorizes equal or more restrictive laws.356 In light of the ACA require-
ments and the Equity Act Final Rule, any state parity law that allows less 
than mandatory and equivalent coverage of non-grandfathered small group 
plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, or Medicaid ABPs would be 
preempted by the adoption of the Equity Act, the ACA, and the Regulations. 
Therefore, state parity acts that allow for less than mandatory or equivalent 
coverage in violation of the federal statutes and regulations should be 
amended so that parity applies to all plans. 
C. Equal Cost Cutting 
Rising health insurance costs are a major concern of public and private 
insurers. Nevertheless, policy makers must seek to reduce costs of care equi-
tably for both medical/surgical benefits and MH/SUD benefits. Insurers can 
practice cost cutting without sacrificing care through patient activation, i.e., 
engaging consumers in prevention, health promotion, care-rationing, and 
cost saving. Patients who are more involved in their health care decisions, 
referred to as having “higher levels of patient activation,” consistently have 
significantly reduced medical costs.357 For instance, patients can choose less 
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expensive alternatives to emergency room visits, such as retail clinics, to 
treat non-threatening illnesses.358 They can ask physicians questions regard-
ing costs of certain services and determine whether such services are neces-
sary or whether there are less expensive options. 
Prevention services can also reduce health care costs. For instance, 
Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment (SBIRT), a three-
step, “comprehensive, integrated, public health approach to the delivery of 
early intervention and treatment services for persons with [SUDs], as well as 
those who are at risk of developing [such] disorders,” has been shown to 
produce cost savings in reduced health expenditures of $3.81 for every 
$1.00 spent, which is a possible savings of $1.2 billion annually.359 Through 
such actions, rising costs may be stunted, even if marginally. Regardless of 
the techniques employed to reduce healthcare spending, it is important that 
cost cutting should apply equally to all kinds of health care—physical, sur-
gical, MH, and SUD services. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite attempts to expand substance use benefits under the Equity 
Act, the ACA, and state parity laws, both private and public insurers have 
consistently denied adequate access to care for patients with SUDs due to 
various ambiguities and loopholes. Should individuals with SUDs face dis-
crimination through noncompliant plans, they should seek enforcement by 
insurance boards, or administrative, state, or federal courts. Plaintiffs may 
also seek enforcement through the IRS whistleblower provisions for an em-
ployer’s failure to meet certain group health plan requirements under 
ERISA, for Equity Act violations, or for noncompliance with the ACA. 
States should enact or amend current state parity laws so that they are more 
stringent than the Equity Act and mandate SUD benefits for all insurance 
plans. Likewise, insurers should amend their plans proactively to comply 
with the Equity Act, the Equity Act Final Rule, and the ACA. They should 
apply cost-cutting measures evenly and fairly to medical/surgical benefits if 
those measures are imposed on mental health/SUD benefits. As these 
measures are consistently taken, the treatment gap for the millions of indi-
viduals with SUDs may finally close, avoiding needless deaths, and achiev-
ing the goals of federal legislation. 
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